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I. INTRODUCTION
In the modem history of the world, the formation of the WTO has
surpassed even the creation of the United Nations, in evoking a high
level of enthusiasm and curiosity among global actors. In academia,
notwithstanding the plethora of intra- and interdisciplinary discourses on
the WTO, 1 there is persistent and growing interest in the existential logic
underlying its institutional structure. With the WTO were born many
new perceptions, on the one hand, and numerous stakeholders-and
their diverse interests-on the other. But despite severe and often bitter
conflicts of interests, the WTO has been the most fertile ground for
concept formation, accompanied by an array of linkages with other
topics (trade and .. .). Most prominent among the terrains that witnessed
normative transformations in the WTO boom has been public international
law (hereinafter "international law"). With the WTO as its nucleus,
international law has been credited with a "thickened" normativity, 2 the spin-
offs of which-sovereignty, command, obligations and sanctions-put it
within the provenance of positivist law. This is not to assert that other
spheres of law were any less influenced or not influenced at all. Rather,
I would contend that the WTO (an auxiliary institution of the neoliberal
scheme) is itself a consequence of the impact sustained by the world
order as a result of the neoliberal wave and not the source of global
transformations. If this is the case, why did international law alone
1. See generally, JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE GATT AND THE
WTO: INSIGHTS ON TREATY LAW AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS (2000); BERNARD M.
HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM: FROM GATT TO WTO (1995); MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1995). For other perspectives, see P.K. RAO,
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2000); CONSTANTINE
MICHALOPOULOS, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO (2001).
2. Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 MICH L. REV. 1, 24
(2004). Pauwelyn uses the expression "thickened normativity" to refer to the judicialness the
WTO has added to international law by way of its Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).
International law was often criticized as having a fragile normativity for want of a strong
judicial body with compulsory jurisdiction and the power to render binding decisions.
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became susceptible to the ramifications of the WTO? I argue that the
transformation which occurred in the normative world of international
law cannot be attributed to the unique institutional features of the WTO;
rather, credit is due to the changes in the social order occasioned by the
neoliberal ideology. Indeed, the establishment of the WTO and its rule-
based architecture was an important project in the larger scheme of
things.
The article proceeds in five parts. In part one, I review the scholarly
skepticism as to how far international law is law in the "hard" sense and
show that this skepticism has always permeated the discipline. In part two,
I go on to examine what has prompted contemporary scholarship to
credit the WTO with helping international law grow out of the "thin"
normativity often attributed to it. The analysis suggests that certain features
of legal positivism customarily associated with law in its strict sense,
which were alleged to be lacking in international law, are found in the
institutional apparatus of the WTO. To test this hypothesis, in part three, I
examine that apparatus in light of the tenets of three prominent positivists-
Bentham, Austin, and Hart-and enquire whether they would have sanctioned
international law had the WTO existed in their day. The conclusion
drawn is that, even with the WTO, their views on international law would
not have been different than what they were. This finding rectifies the
myths that regard the WTO as a positivist enterprise. Part four of the
article undertakes to demonstrate that neoliberalism is the driving force
of not only the WTO but also the normative and structural global changes
all around. To this end, the analysis conceptualizes neoliberalism and then
demonstrates how the WTO serves the implementation of the neoliberal
agenda. As a corollary, in part five, positivism and neoliberalism are
critically juxtaposed and shown to stand in harmony with one another.
The conclusion highlights the extent to which the findings can restructure
the outlook of international lawyers towards the WTO.
Before proceeding, however, a short note on the style and methodology
used in the article is in order. Given the nature of the topic at hand, the
article speaks an interdisciplinary language. Parts one and two highlight
the scholarly standpoints within international law. Part three is a theoretical
endeavor to dispel the myths surrounding the WTO. For this purpose,
conventional wisdom is re-explored through an extensive treatment of
the relevant legal philosophy. A summation of the arguments at the end
of part three provides the rationale for the undertaking and links it with
the broader discourse. In part four, in conceptualizing neoliberalism, the
central line of reasoning is built on certain basic notions of economics,
although only in moderate detail. A substantial portion of part four is
"homework" on the position of international organizations within the
fields of international relations and sociology, understanding then facilitates
the examination of the true legal nature of the WTO. My sole task is to
provide a credible explanation for the authority of international organizations
in general and the WTO in particular. In that process, neoliberalism
emerges as a protagonist, albeit in its simple and general form, as
conceptualized in part four. In other words, neoliberalism is not dealt
with in the strict international relations sense, which is too constrained
vis-A-vis the concept at large. However, care is taken to ensure that this
approach does not adulterate the fundamental thesis of neoliberalism
even as it appears in the international relations literature.
Throughout the article, I use the expressions "institution" and
"organization" synonymously, except where these are expressly differentiated.
At certain points the article has had to view the developmental process
of the trading system from different perspectives; this is a natural
consequence of the interdisciplinary nature of the topic. Each part and
many sections are summarized to aid the reader in following the discourse.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE COMMON SKEPTICISM
ABOUT ITS LEGALITY
The authors of virtually every treatise and textbook on international
law start their exposition with the skeptical and quite often rhetorical
question "Is international law real law?" They then proceed, in assorted
ways and through various approaches, to demonstrate that international
law is indeed law. Most scholars, at the outset, bring in its relationship
with municipal law, then quickly distance themselves from the issue by
stating that international law, being a legal system in its own right,
cannot be compared with municipal law and that this relativism is the
cause of all the misconceptions concerning international law. Having
made such a caveat, scholars then fall back on finding systems and
institutions similar to that of municipal law in international law. Some
rely on logical deductions and philosophical assertions. In general, these
exercises end up with a formulation to the effect that international law is
law, albeit imperfect, but an indestructible reality; in other words, that it
has some practical complexity although not an intrinsic impossibility,
but... . However, this skeptical approach is not universal. A majority
of the nineteenth century classical scholars rejected international law out
of hand, albeit with rationalizations that showed true adherence to their
cults. Hugo Grotius, the father of international law, had the conviction
that sovereign states are bound by the law of nations. Although he
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attributed this bindingness to the "consent" factor among states, he saw
its roots in the law of nature, which is based on and deduced from the
nature of man as a social being.3 Hobbes and Pufendorf had already
answered the question as to the legality, let alone bindingness, of
international law in the negative.4 When legal positivism established its
strong hold in the jurisprudential realm, the metaphysical speculations of
natural law went into oblivion. One of the doyens of this anti-natural
law movement, Jeremy Bentham, refused to accept the prospect that, in
his time, any form of law regulating the actions of states would exist.
5
He believed that anyone could divert what was then considered
international law to satisfy his or her political caprices by arguing that it
conferred rights bequeathed from natural law. 6 Bentham's antipathy
towards international law only pertained to its natural law form; he in no
way was antagonistic towards it as such and in fact later devised a plan
for universal and perpetual peace in his Principles of International Law.7
In determining the province of jurisprudence, the positivist John Austin
ousted international law from the very start. According to Austin, to be
within the province of jurisprudence, the prospective legal system must
emanate from a determinate superior and that superior shall not be in the
habit of obedience to any other determinate superior.8 With this bearing,
international law-merely the declaration of a certain type of conduct
that is in sync with the sentiments of an undefined mass-was repugnant
to him.9 However, the Austinian theory of sovereignty and concept of
the superior sovereign's command had a profound impact on later
3. H. Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 10, 16-18 (Richard Falk et al. eds., 1985).
4. 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 8-9 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts
eds., 9th ed. 1992).
5. Jeremy Bentham, Essay 1: Objects of International Law, in PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW available at http://www.1a.utexas.edu/research/poltheory/bentham/
pil/pil.e0l .html.
6. Hart dubbed this situation "criterionlessness." H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM:
STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 82 (1982).
7. Jeremy Bentham, Essay 4: A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace, in
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW available at http://www.la.utexas.edu/research/pol
theory/bentham/pil/pil.e04.html. See generally M.W. Janis, Comment, Jeremy Bentham and
the Fashioning of "International Law, " 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 405 (1984); H.B. Jacobini,
Note, Some Observations Concerning Jeremy Bentham's Concepts of International Law,
42 AM. J. INT'L L. 415 (1948).
8. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 166-67
(Wilfrid Rumble ed., 1995).
9. See generally id Austin refused to accept international law as being a positive
morality.
scholarship, so much so that the theory became the primary cause of
skepticism regarding the legality of international law. The post-Austinian
scholars fixed Austin's precepts of sovereignty and sanction as the
systematic way to present international law in its totality, and soon lost
themselves in that wildemess.10 It is no surprise that later commentators
focused their attention on defending these criteria by searching for a
supreme legislature to command, a judiciary to punish violators, and an
executive body to enforce the decisions of the legislature and the
judiciary and to impose sanctions upon violators.
A considerable proportion of modem scholars have defended the
Austinian checklist by pointing to the institutional features of the United
Nations, although most treatments end up with the idea of there being
only a possibility of international law becoming a complete system.1
Indeed, reference to the United Nations, is the most unsophisticated of
the defenses, for it is a refined way of going back to the old notions of
self-help, retorsion and reprisals that hankered for legitimization. A
somewhat different position is taken by Louis Henkin, who defended the
legality of international law by highlighting the presence of a compliance
culture in international law analogous to that in domestic legal systems.
12
This compliance culture, according to Henkin, stems from certain internal
motivations and external inducements such as sanctions and remedies.
13
The threat of retaliation, collective actions, remedies in the form of damages
or repairs-such as inter-state claims through institutional means-and
recourse to "machineries" acts as an inducement to compliance.' 4 Although
constructed on a conceptual plane, Henkin's postulation is nothing more
than a metaphysical description of the United Nations system itself, for
his factors of inducement are illustrated with examples that closely resemble
the United Nations machinery.
Another set of scholars, among them Vattel, Triepel, and Anzilotti,
attributed the bindingness of international law to the fact that it is a
result of agreements between sovereign states. The politico-juridical
fiction of the sovereignty of states and the inference that every agreement is
a fusion of the wills of such states, and thereby a "higher will," served as
10. Harris, in his notes to Brierly's The Law of Nations, addresses this situation as
an "Austinian handicap." Although this has placed international lawyers on the defensive,
they would not dispute that the test has more utility than many others by which
international law could be said to be "law." D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (6th ed. 2004).
11. See, e.g., OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4, at 8-13.
12. Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 48-57 (1995).
13. Id. at 49.
14. Id. at 50-60.
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the logical point of departure for this thesis. 5 Within the school, scholars
like Anzilotti, in contradistinction to his counterparts, sought the fundamental
logic regarding the validity of agreements in a "basic norm" and not in a
"united will." For Anzilotti, pacta sunt servanda constituted this basic
norm..16 But the juridical construction of pacta sunt servanda could only
put the debate into a state of vacillation, as Tunkin later illustrated:
If agreement is the sole means of creating norms of international law, say
bourgeois jurists, the binding force of its norms rests upon the international
legal principle or norm pacta sunt servanda. But on what is the legal force of
this principle based? If one says that it is based on agreement, a new question
arises: on what is the legal force of that agreement based? The juridical
construction did not answer the question and went on ad infinitum. 17
This vacillation gave way to the Kelsenian theory of the hierarchy of
norms. 18 Kelsen envisaged law as a hierarchical structure, succinctly
paraphrased by W.B. Stern: "[t]he constitution stands above the statute,
the statute above the ordinance, and any norm-setting organ is a higher
organ than one which does not set norms but merely applies them."'
' 9
According to Kelsen, it is not the legal order of the states but international
law that occupies the highest stage atop the norm pyramid in the
hierarchy of law,2 ° thus making it the hypothetical basic norm of the
legal order.
Kelsen, as a general rule opposed the consent theory whereby
international law is a creation of only the consent of states. Then, through a
regressive process, he arrived at the norm pacta sunt servanda.2 1
However, pacta sunt servanda is a norm created by custom.22  Thus,
primarily international law is customary law.23 Kelsen's main aim in
15. G.I. TuNKiN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 208-09 (William E. Butler trans.,
1974).
16. Id. at 209.
17. Id. at 218.
18. See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 123-61 (Anders
Wedberg trans., 1946).
19. W.B. Stern, Kelsen's Theory ofInternational Law, 30 AM. POL. SC. REV. 736,
(1936). For the original exposition, see KELSEN, supra note 18.
20. See generally HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (The Lawbook
Exchange, Ltd 2003) (1952). For a quick and focused treatment, see Stern, supra note
19, at 736-37. For another insightful approach, see Henry Janzen, Kelsen's Theory of
Law, 31 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 205 (1937).
21. KELSEN, supra note 18, at 369-70.
22. Id.
23. Id.
this exercise was to refute the notion of state sovereignty as the basic
factor that confers bindingness on international law.
For Kelsen, international law is law like any other law, and the norms
of international law share similar characteristics with municipal law.
Hence, the norms of international law can be analyzed by the same
method of analysis as used for the analysis of norms generally.2 4 This
analysis led Kelsen to be defensive with regard to the Austinian checklist.
When defining a legal obligation by the sanction it entails, Kelsen
argued that international law in fact had sanctions available to it in the
form of wars and reprisals. However, this assertion cannot be taken as
definitive of his theory, for he later said that such sanctions are sanctions
of a primitive decentralized legal order lacking any forms of centralized
machinery.26 The essence of Kelsen's arguments inter alia27 aims at a
centralized system for international law in which primary importance is
attributed to an institution with compulsory jurisdiction for settling
international disputes. This brings Kelsen, who himself was a staunch
advocate of the United Nations system, very close to those who defended
the Austinian test through the United Nations institutional structure.
As the Austinian test permeated international law scholarship and
scholars succumbed to its umbral influence, H.L.A. Hart took a bold
initiative to rupture the mold. What made Hart a radical philosopher of
law was his innovative account of the concept of law, which he formulated
in its entirety on the bricks of Austinian theory while patching up the
Achilles' heel of that theory. Hart's concept of law represents a complete
departure from the Austinian version by asserting that the concept of
coercive sanctions and sovereignty are not essential apparatuses of law. 28
His conviction is that every mature legal system is a union of two kinds
of rules: primary and secondary rules.29 Primary rules are those under
which human beings are required to do or abstain from doing certain
actions whether they wish to or not. Secondary rules are those that authorize
human beings to introduce, modify, or control the primary rules by
doing or saying certain things.
30
Hart did not dismiss international law from the world of law as such.
He in fact refuted some of the routine criticisms against the discipline,
24. Stem, supra note 19, at 737.
25. See KELSEN, supra note 18, at 330. For a comprehensive treatment, see
KELSEN, supra note 20, at 20-89.
26. KELSEN, supra note 18, at 339-4 1.
27. For the other facets of Kelsinian theory that have been overlooked by
international law scholarship, see Charles Leben, Hans Kelsen and the Advancement of
International Law, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 287 (1998).
28. H.L.A. HART, CONCEPT OF LAW 215-21 (1961).
29. See id. at 77-96.
30. Id. at 78-79.
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which he believed were on shaky ground. However, his main objection
to international law's legality was that instead of being a union of primar7
and secondary rules, international law was simply a set of primary rules.
Since international law is made up only of primary rules, it suffers from
three deficiencies-inefficiency, uncertainty, and a static character. It is
inefficient because there is no organized way to settle disputes or enforce
sanctions; it is uncertain because there is no established procedure for
determining whether or not a particular rule belongs to the set; and it is
static because there is no way to deliberately introduce new rules into
the set. Hart believed that only secondary rules of adjudication, change,
and recognition could overcome these defects. Thus, it was the absence
of secondary rules that made international law unacceptable as law to
Hart, as he was quite convinced that the routine shortcomings associated
with it could be surmounted.
From this brief evaluation, it appears that none of the post-nineteenth
century scholars were free from the influence of the skepticism as to the
"hardness" of international law, whereas the pre-nineteenth century
scholarship, mainly continued a superstitious adherence to natural law
and hence remained free of the skeptical penumbra. Early positivists,
like Bentham, were so preoccupied with their annihilation of natural law
notions that their entire focus was on building a new architecture in
keeping with their own faith and convictions. With Austin's imperative
theory of law, the skepticism "Is international law a real law?" became a
nagging question, upsetting international lawyers and placing them on
the defensive. Since Austin, scholars have in one way or another desperately
sought systems and a mechanism to satisfy the Austinian test, Hart being
an exception.32 Post World War II scholars, while they have found
consolation in the institutional features of the United Nations, have
failed to produce a compelling case for international law.
However, with the establishment of the WTO, international lawyers
found the missing elements of real law in the organization's institutional
apparatus. The next part of the article articulates the response of
international law scholars to the institutional features of the WTO.
31. Id. at 209.
32. Even before Hart many other commentators expressed their dissatisfaction
with the Austinian test in strong rhetoric but none could frame a theory as credible as
Hart's. See, e.g., Payson S. Wild, What is the Trouble with International Law?, 32 AM.
POL. Sci. REv. 478 (1938).
III. THE WTO IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE ASCENSION
OF NORMATIVE VALUES
It has been opined that the establishment of the WTO was a
"watershed innovation" for international law.33 While enthusiasts considered
the WTO to be the rise of constitutionalism in international law in
general (constitutionalism is not a positive phenomenon for all), and the
quasi-judicialization of international trade law in particular, critics found
a new authoritarianism and judicial activism in the basic process of
international law.34 Accolades, as well as accusations, tacitly acknowledge
that the WTO has substantially changed the normative terrain of international
law. As one commentator noted in the context of the WTO and its
organizational allies: "The usual lament that international laws lack
enforcement mechanisms does not apply to these institutions. They do
not merely bark, they also bite.,
35
Scholarly perceptions on the might of the WTO vary. It is difficult to
give a strict taxonomical base for the views, because the perceptions
overlap and most rely on others. But, it is possible to deduce one
common factor from these views: despite minor differences in their
approaches, they all converge at the dispute settlement mechanism of the
WTO.36 Considering this fact, this paper will bring together these views
and make some generalizations, although not within any watertight
compartments.
First, there is a group of scholars who optimistically view the
regulatory shift in international trade from the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to the WTO. Let us call them relativists.
33. This expression was first used by Jackson in conceptualizing the WTO. See
John H. Jackson, The World Trade Organisation: Watershed Innovation or Cautious
Small Step Forward?, 18 WORLD EcoN., Autumn 1995, at 11 (1995).
34. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 6. On the criticism regarding authoritarianism, see
Anupam Chander, Globalization and Distrust, 114 YALE L. J. 1193, 1195 (2005). Chander's
criticisms are directed towards all post-cold war institutions. On the pros and cons of
constitutionalism, see Jan Klabbers, Constitutionalism Lite, 1 INT'L ORG. L. REv. 31 (2004).
35. B.S. Chimni, International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the
Making, 15 EuR. J. INT'L L. 1, 7 (2004).
36. What is unique in dispute settlement in the WTO is the automatic accession to
the common Dispute Settlement Body. Pursuant to Article 23 of the Understanding on
the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), all members are
obliged to submit their disputes to the WTO and abide by the rules and procedures laid
down by the Understanding. According to Article 21 "Prompt compliance with the
recommendations or rulings of the DSB is essential ...." and the DSB monitors the
matter until compliance has occurred. Where a recommendation or ruling is not
implemented within a reasonable time, the WTO prescribes compensation for the
aggrieved party or suspension of concessions for the violator. See Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments-
Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
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They evaluate the WTO and derive its positive features by comparing it
with GATT.37 Their main argument is that GATT, despite being an
international agreement and even having its own 8Jurisprudence, was
never an effective mechanism for international law.3 This was because
of GATT's inability to secure compliance, mainly owing to a weak
dispute settlement system that lacked a "beyond doubt" legitimacy to
issue a command or enforce it. 39 This argument of the relativists seems
credible, for none of the commentators of international law, to this
author's knowledge, have relied on the GATT system for advancing
their argument regarding the bindingness of international law. Unlike in
GATT, in the WTO the relativists quite obviously find a quasi-automatic,
legalized, and rule-based dispute settlement body with enforcement
powers-the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). The DSB not only decides
on breaches of WTO rules but makes suggestions on how to bring
measures into conformity with those rules; it also monitors and induces
compliance. 40 This comparative advantage over GATT in securing
compliance makes the WTO an important apparatus for international
law.
A second group of scholars sees the might of the WTO in its rule-
based system and rule-oriented approach. Jackson is the most prominent
among the "rule activists," although he cannot be strictly assigned to this
school alone. His convictions are predicated on the role of ensuring
predictability that the WTO has to fulfill in the multilateral trading
system.41 He argues that the existence of rules enables the members to
have an awareness of the expectations that the trading system has of
them and that this in turn will lead parties to focus on the rules of the
42system. Correspondingly, in dispute settlement, as the settlement
progresses, the rule-oriented approach reveals to the participants the
37. See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION
AND JURISPRUDENCE 81-100 (1998).
38. Thomas Cottier, Preparing for Structural Reform within the WTO, 10 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 497,498 (2007) (suggesting structural and functional reform).
39. See generally JACKSON, supra note 1.
40. For more information on the advantages of the WTO's dispute settlement
mechanism over that of other international organizations, including GATT, see Joost
Pauwelyn, Comment, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules
-Toward a More Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 335, 338-39 (2000). For
details on the international law effects of the GATT dispute settlement panel report, see
JACKSON, supra note 1, at 124-29.
41. Id. at 121.
42. Id. at 120-22.
likely outcome of the case, prompting compliance with the rules.43 Thus,
the rule-based and rule-oriented system enhances compliance in a
decentralized international legal system.
A third group of scholars-the largest-comprises those who rely on
the sanctioning arm of the WTO. They believe in the range of the
sanctioning power of the dispute settlement mechanism and that it is this
range that has been material in hardening the normativity of international
law." They generally find three key features in the WTO that are absent
in the dispute settlement systems of most other international treaties: (1) (the
presence of) panels with compulsory jurisdiction to examine complaints
about violations of the WTO Agreements; (2) (the provision for an) appellate
review of the decisions of the panels with compulsory jurisdiction; and
(3) the ability to issue binding decisions.45 Should these mechanisms
fail, there will be authorized retaliatory sanctions, which will induce the
violator to comply with the obligation that it has violated.46 The sanctions
available under the WTO's dispute settlement system are compensation
and suspension of concessions. 47 "If the Member concerned fails to bring
the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement into
compliance ... such Member shall . . . enter into negotiations with [the
member] having invoked the dispute settlement procedures. 48  If no
satisfactory compensation has been reached, the complaining member
may seek authorization to suspend the application to the member
concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered
agreements from the DSB. 4 9 The vitality of these sanctions rests on
the fact that all the decisions-establishing of panels, referring the
matter for appellate review and suspending of concessions-are taken by
negative consensus,50 making sanctions virtually automatic and unavoidable.
This guarantees greater compliance with the rules.
The sanction group repeatedly prefixes the expression "binding" when
speaking of the decisions of the DSB; to rationalize this, they repeatedly
rely on the relative advantage that the WTO dispute settlement system
has over that of the GATT.
43. John H. Jackson, Dispute Settlement and the WTO: Emerging Problems, 1 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 329 (1998), reprinted in JACKSON, supra note 1, at 168-92, 179-80.
44. See, e.g., Brendan P. McGivem, Seeking Compliance with WTO Rulings: Theory,
Practice and Alternatives, 36 INT'L LAW. 141 (2002).
45. Id. at 142.
46. Id. at 144.
47. DSU art. 22(1).
48. DSU art. 22(2).
49. DSU art. 22. For an appraisal of the WTO sanctions, see Steve Charnovitz,
Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 792 (2001).
50. See infra Part V.C.2.
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A fourth group of scholars hold the view that the WTO's power derives
from certain non-legal factors. Robert Howse articulates the argument
of this group: "[t]he WTO has no power independent of the rules agreed
to by consensus of the member states;" its power lies in the fact that it is
based on "domestic political procedures that have the legitimacy prescribed
by domestic constitutional arrangements. 51 Jackson attributed the bindingness
of the decisions of the WTO to the "credibility of the judgment that is
rendered and the potential of that judgment to raise diplomatic hurdles
for a nation that tries to ignore it."'52 Even with the most tactful diplomacy,
powerful trading entities cannot break away from the dispute settlement
system.53
As mentioned earlier, regardless of the variations in approaches, the
scholarly views regarding the bindingness of WTO rules and decisions
converge at the institutional features of the dispute settlement mechanism.
While the first group-the relativists-is content with the regulatory
shift in the legal controls from GATT to the WTO, the second finds the
emphasis on "rules" to be effective in securing compliance. The third
group focuses on showing that the WTO has teeth to bite, while the
fourth, remaining within the enthusiast camp, seeks justifications for the
bindingness of the decisions in the non-legal realm. The cumulative
effect of these views is to say that WTO rules are binding. Yet binding
in what sense? Jackson says they are binding "in the traditional international
law sense" but adds, although "not always in a 'statute like' sense.,
54
Jackson's conviction and the pessimism attached to it, as well as the
views considered above, reveal that what the scholars have found in the
WTO is exactly what post-Austinian scholars were desperately searching
for in international law. With the might of the WTO established by
stressing its sentencing power, the enthusiasts demonstrated that the
WTO is a new manifestation of legal positivism centered on states: its
commands are the commands of a sovereign because it is generally obeyed
and, if disobeyed, it punishes the disobedience.
51. Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy-and Back Again: The Fate of
the Multilateral Trade Regime, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 94, 106 (2002).
52. John H. Jackson, Appraising the Launch and Functioning of WTO, 39 GERMAN
Y.B. INT'L L. 20, 33 (1996).
53. Id.
54. John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding-
Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 60, 63 (1997)
(emphasis omitted).
III. THE WTO AND CLASSICAL POSITIVISM:
BENTHAM, AUSTIN, AND HART
The formation of the WTO was a consolation for the Austinian international
lawyers, as many of them saw their as well as their predecessors' unfulfilled
expectations being realized in the organization. They might have then
slept peacefully having liberated international law from the criticisms of
Austinian positivism. But were they successful in their endeavor? Were
they "shadow boxing" all those years with their own misunderstandings
as the adversaries? Was Austin not properly understood as a philosopher of
his time? Was he the victim of an over-simplistic interpretation? If he
were given the benefit of the doubt, would it open the doors to conceptual
fallacies meaning that the international lawyers of a century had a
"hangover?" These questions should probably be answered in the affirmative.
This assertion might make at least some readers skeptical about this
approach. Will this paper re-explore Austinian wisdom and provide him
with a defense? Why are Bentham and Hart included in this analysis?
How is "revisiting" the positivist trio going to help in this paper's central
assertion that the WTO is a neoliberal project?
The discussion presented in part one reveals that there was skepticism
as to the legality of international law, which mainly owed to a reliance
on the Austinian test of a sovereign and its sanctions as the sole test to
determine "real law." The impact created by Austin's theory was so
profound that it became not only the acid test of real law but also the
hallmark of legal positivism. Although positivism was later painted in
different shades by Kelsen and Hart, Austin continued to be its icon and
his test remained the only applicable test for law. Since the early nineteenth
century and throughout a good part of the twentieth, international law
was subject to the Austinian test and hence remained outside the realm
of real law. With the establishment of the WTO, as it began to display
Austinian elements, the law that housed the organization-international
law-was admitted into the realm of positivism. Contemporary international
lawyers treat the WTO as a positivist bank, refuting any argument
disparaging the legality of international law by pointing to the organization.
It is true that scholars found international law in a new and relatively
better environment after the WTO and called it "positivism in international
law." However, this relatively better environment is neither a result of
the WTO, nor Austinian positivism as it is generally understood. To
support my contention, I will demonstrate that even with the WTO the
positivists would not have accepted international law into their domain.
To this end, I refer to the teachings of Bentham, Austin and Hart. The
criteria for choosing and confining the analysis to this trio are the
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following: first, they represent three varying schools of thought within
legal positivism; second, each built his theory on his predecessor's teachings,
albeit without blind adherence; and third, a chronological tracking of
positivism helps to determine the common tenet that all of them were
following. This process also dispels the scholarly misconceptions of
Austin and reveals that he was only acting in accordance with the central
positivist tenet, but in its then current form, and that he was a man of his
time and his positivism was a positivism of the age.
If it is neither Austinian positivism, nor the WTO, that has brought
international law into a relatively better environment, what then has been
the force behind the change? I assert in the subsequent sections that it is
neoliberalism, and contend that the WTO is a passive neoliberal
structure-an important project in the larger scheme of things-and that
it is the corollaries of the neoliberal wave which scholars have mistaken
for Austinian positivism. Prior to substantiating these claims, I summarize
the views of the three positivists, showing that positivism never changed
its core but only its form.
Before I proceed with the three scholars, let me explain in brief the
positive theory of law. Legal positivism is a school of thought that arose
under the long-term influence of the scientific discoveries that started in
the seventeenth century and the eighteenth century philosophy of
enlightenment rationalism. 55 Its primary objective was "the exclusion of
every trace of []metaphysics from investigations of natural phenomena...."56
Positivists held that everything must be first observed experimentally
and then understood in terms of facts independent of any subjective
evaluation of the factual matter. In sum, the positive theory opposed any
attempt to link observable and empirically deducible facts with moral
values and judgments.57 This sentiment gave birth to the fundamental
tenets of positivism: 1) the separability thesis that there is no necessary
connection between law and morality; and 2) the source thesis, or social
thesis, that legal validity is determined ultimately by reference to certain
basic social facts.58 All later positivists based their postulations on these
two tenets.59
55. MARK TEBBIT, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 17 (2000).
56. Id. at 16-17.
57. Id. at 17.
58. Id.
59. For an introduction to legal positivism, see LORD LLOYD & M.D.A. FREEMAN,
LLOYD'S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed. 1985). For its different versions, see
HART, supra note 28; JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
A. Bentham and Utilitarianism
In this sub-section, I first briefly introduce Bentham's utilitarianism
and what makes him a positivist and then make an evaluation of Bentham's
views and conclude that he would have had the same position had the
WTO existed in his day.
Until the late eighteenth century, positivism was in an embryonic state
and focused on the annihilation of natural law notions. At that time, it
was mainly discussed and debated as a political philosophy: its full
elaboration came only with Jeremy Bentham and his utilitarianism.
60
Bentham's utilitarianism 61-based on the principle "general happiness is
the right and proper end of human action" (utility)-did not offer a
strong logical foundation for positivism but nevertheless created a
favorable climate for the move towards it. Bentham's entry into the limelight
coincided with the escalating anti-natural law movement, and he played
the role of perpetuating "utility," which was looked upon as the then
rational and scientific standard; as noted by a commentator: "[t]owards
the end of eighteenth century, it is not only the thinkers, it is all the
English who are speaking the language of utility."
62
Bentham's antipathy for natural law made him repudiate concepts like
natural rights and state of nature, which he considered a mere fiction, a
phantom, and a formidable entity used by a great multitude of people to
support their false claims.63 He believed that the law of nature provided
no force by any means and hence advocated the strict separation of law
MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Batoche Books 2000) (1781); AUSTIN, supra note 8. For
support, see JOSEPH RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY
(1979); W. J. WALUCHOW, INCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM (1994). For a critical appraisal,
see POSITIVISM TODAY (Stephen Guest ed., 1996). On the separation of law and morals,
see H.L.A Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593 (1958).
60. DENNIS LLOYD, THE IDEA OF LAW 100 (1981). Utilitarianism is a theory
proposed by David Hume in the eighteenth century. It is a political philosophy advancing the
idea that explanation of moral principles is to be sought in the utility they tend to
promote. Bentham was so influenced by Hume that he adhered completely to the concept of
utility. Based on the aphorism "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," Bentham
formulated his theory of utility as every action should be judged right or wrong on the
basis of the extent to which that action promotes or damages the happiness of the
community. He recognized the fundamental role of pain and pleasure in human conduct
and believed that human behavior was motivated by a desire to obtain pleasure and avoid
pain. Since pleasure is equated with good, human beings must seek pleasure, and that
must be the ultimate end of human life. To measure the net-value of pain and pleasures
in a given action, Bentham devised an "emotional machine" called felicific calculus.
BENTHAM, supra note 59, at 31-32.
61. For an overview of Bentham's utilitarianism, see GEOFFREY SCARRE,
UTILITARIANISM 72-81 (1996).
62. Wesley C. Mitchell, Bentham's Felicific Calculus, 33 POL. SCI. Q. 161, 163 (1918)
(quoting ELIE HALEVY, 1 LA FORMATION DU RADICALISME PHILOSOPHIQUE 231 (1901).
63. See generally BENTHAM, supra note 59.
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from morals.64 He then outlined a general theory of legal duty and
obligation.65 At this juncture, he found the principle of utility to be the
best way to greater reforms.66
In advocating utility, Bentham developed such a penchant for it that in
all his subsequent works he made it a point to advocate this principle as
the basis of every action and concept.67 One sees the principle of utility
throughout Betham's works-be it constitutional reforms, the criminal
code, or international law. The sway this principle had over Bentham is
reflected in this excerpt from The Principles of Morals and Legislation:
Intense, long, certain, speedy, fruitful, pure-Such marks in pleasures and in
pains endure. Such pleasures seek if private be thy end: If it be
public, wide let them extend. Such pains avoid, whichever be thy
view: If pains must come, let them extend to few.68
Bentham believed that the means should be determined by the end,
and the end he envisioned was utility. However, Bentham was aware
that men do not all spontaneously desire utility--"the greatest happiness
of the greatest number"-because of the self-interested nature of human
beings;6 9 this interest must be created in the minds of individuals for the
principle of utility to work. The interest must be created by contriving
devices, in the form of coercive sanctions, by which selfish individuals
must serve the pleasure of others to get pleasure for themselves.7 °
Bentham brought together individual interests and interests of the
community through the imposition of sanctions by the legislator and
society. 71 Here, Bentham argued that law is the command expressingthe will of a sovereign.72
64. See HART, supra note 6, at 82-94.
65. See Id. at 127-143.
66. Ross HARRISON, BENTHAM: THE ARGUMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHIES 169 (1999).
67. Id.
68. BENTHAM, supra note 59, at 29. (This verse is quoted from the 1948 edition of
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation and is absent in the 2000 edition
published by Batoche Books).
69. The self-interested nature of individuals is explained by Ayer as the reason why,
for a particular action, individuals find that the greatest happiness of the community
stemming from that action is also that which is causative to their own greatest happiness.
See PHILIP SCHOFIELD, JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY, AND LEGAL
POSITIvISM 7 (2003), available at http://www.ucl.ac.uklaws/academics/profiles/docs/schofield_
inaugO60203.pdf
70. Mitchell, supra note 62, at 177-78.
71. SCHOFIELD, supra note 50, at 7 (drawing on Ayer's defense against the critics
of Bentham).
72. This line of reasoning is continued in HART, supra note 6, at 105-26.
In postulating the powers of a sovereign, Bentham was influenced
by the Hobbesian view that the command of a sovereign constituted law
because it was given to subjects already under a prior obligation stemming
from their contract with each other to obey the sovereign. 73 Later, the
influence of Hume's version of the social contract caused Bentham to
flout the Hobbesian version of sovereignty. Bentham persisted in the
conviction that the obligation to obey a sovereign is attributable to the
sovereign if there is a reason for doing so, which "in part is natural and
in part man-made artefact." 74 At the same time, he held that the legislative
powers of a sovereign are not bestowed by law because law manifests
only from the will of the sovereign.75 However, the power of a sovereign
that is not bestowed by law is a result of a "social situation," the account
of which needs no "normative terms;" this social situation constitutes
"the disposition of the people." 76 At this juncture, Benthamite theory
touches the social thesis of legal positivism whereby the validity of law
is determined ultimately by reference to certain basic social facts.
The question of import is to what extent Bentham would have found
the WTO agreeable. Quite obviously, the utilitarian in him would have
tested the utility that an institution like the WTO produces. Whatever
his stance as a utilitarian might have been is less relevant in this context,
however, for the concerns of this paper relates to the sovereignty and
sanction aspect of the WTO. Hence, the focus is limited to two points:
1) would Bentham have accepted the sovereign power that is said to be
present in the WTO?; and 2) would he have found the logic of sanctions
in the WTO consistent with his theory of sanctions?
First, to debate the sovereign status of the WTO, one should understand
that Bentham separated the powers of a sovereign from the powers of its
subordinates. The subordinates' powers are conferred by law, which is
a command of the sovereign, whereas the sovereign gains its law-conferring
power from the social situation, which is a non-legal situation. The WTO is
the result of an agreement between states and has powers from the rules
agreed to by the states. Therefore, it cannot meet the Benthamite requirement
that a sovereign's power must come from a non-legal force.77 Yet, it
73. Id. at 221. See also THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Richard Tuck ed., 1991).
74. HART, supra note 6, at 221.
75. Id. at 224.
76. Id. at221.
77. The basic statute that establishes the WTO is the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement) negotiated by the
contracting parties in the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(1986-1993). Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1144 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legale/04-wto.pdf
[hereinafter WTO Agreement]. The WTO Agreement has an appendix consisting twenty-
nine individual legal texts that deal with various substantive rights, twenty-eight additional
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could be argued that the social situation that preceded the creation of the
WTO and gave rise to certain "forces"-the emergence of a network
society that had fetched the interdependence among states and necessitated
some kind of institutional coordination-made the WTO a sovereign
power. Regrettably, this situation only makes the forces that created the
WTO the sovereign. It is the command of this sovereign that created the
WTO. Nonetheless, the WTO fits reasonably well into the Benthamite
scheme as a subordinate to the sovereign, which exercises the powers
conferred by the latter.
Second, the complementarity of the WTO's sanctions with Bentham's
sanction theory requires examination. For Bentham, sanctions mean
punishments, "a suffering which befalls a man ... if it be supposed to
befall him through any imprudence of his ... if inflicted by the law."
78
In other words, a sanction is an evil inflicted on an offender by the law,
which has the authority to do so. Bentham's theory of punishment
was basically a progressive one that aimed to prevent crimes and ensure
public safety, not a "backward-looking" practice that aimed at "retribution
based on desert., 79 Now the relevant query is whether this theory is
complementary to the trade sanctions under WTO. Nowhere in the WTO
agreements does the word "sanctions" appear. However, supporters of
the sanction part of the WTO rely on Article 22 of the Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU),
which embodies the provision for compensation and suspension of
concessions.80 General WTO scholarship considers these two measures
as the consequence of disobeying the rules and decisions of the WTO.
Lamentably, this is a misconstruction. What Article 22 imposes is not a
punishment for noncompliance but the means to secure compliance:
81
ministerial declarations, decisions, and understandings that provide further obligations and
commitments, as well as 26000 pages of computer printouts detailing each member's tariff
concessions and service commitments. For details, see JACKSON, supra note 1; Anne 0.
Krueger, Introduction to WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 1 (Anne 0. Krueger
ed., 1998); HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 1.
78. BENTHAM, supra note 59, at 28.
79. See generally Hugo Bedau, Bentham 's Theory of Punishment: Origin and
Content, 7 J. BENTHAM STUD. (2004).
80. See generally YENKONG NGANGJOH HODU, WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
AND THE ISSUE OF COMPLIANCE: PERSPECTIVES IN THE REMEDIES AGAINST NON-COMPLIANCE
(2006).
81. Chamovitz, supra note 49, at 804.
Compensation and the suspension of concessions or other obligations are
temporary measures available in the event that the recommendations and rulings
are not implemented within a reasonable period of time. However, neither
compensation nor the suspension of concessions or other obligations is preferred to
full implementation of a recommendation to bring a measure into conformity
with the covered agreements. Compensation is voluntary and, if granted, shall
be consistent with the covered agreements. 82
Thus, the so-called sanction measures in the WTO have the "externally
directed" purpose of encouraging compliance.83 This is not what Bentham
intended by his punitive theory, which aimed at deterrence and reformation.
If the WTO had been a case in Bentham's time, he likely would not
have taken a different stance; there is nothing extraordinary in the WTO
that would have appealed to a reformist like Bentham. He never was
antagonistic towards international law as such but did object to its natural
law form. The presence of the WTO would not have changed Bentham's
perceptions on international law in any way, for what he required was a
supreme sovereign that is bestowed with power by a social situation and
a system of punishment based on deterrence and reformation. The WTO
proved to have neither of these features.
B. Austin and the Imperative Theory of Law
Austin's analytical jurisprudence sought a definition of law in connection
with a sovereign, where sovereignty is employed to define law in its84
proper sense. To Austin every law implies a command of a sovereign,
which is habitually obeyed by the bulk of society and which is not in
habitual obedience to anyone. If the sovereign's will is not complied
with, it inflicts punishments.85 In sum, Austin's theory of law comprises
a supreme sovereign, habitual obedience, commands, and punishments-
the purported requirements of real law.
In jurisprudence whatever Austin said was prejudicially branded as
sterile verbalism, caricaturizations, metaphysical formulations, "ill-informed
dialectic," and irrational. However, one cannot ignore the irony here, as
the conferrers of these accusatory labels had built their theories on
Austin's tomb.86 The critics were aware that the best way to be successful
was to be Austinian, yet they desired to be known as those who revived
jurisprudence from Austinian sophistries. This hypocrisy owes much to the
straightforwardness and minimalism involved in Austin's command
82. DSU art. 22.
83. Charnovitz, supra note 49, at 803.
84. See AUSTrN, supra note 8.
85. See generally id
86. Neil Duxbury, English Jurisprudence Between Austin and Hart, 91 VA. L. REV.
1, 6-14 (2005) (articulating the jurisprudential mood in the academia after Austin).
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theory because it takes a scholar directly to the central concerns of
jurisprudence. This does not mean that Austin's theory is flawless, but a
mistaken perception of any theory will beget a mistaken result, particularly
when it is applied to make judgments on concepts and institutions of
modern relevance such as the WTO. Austin's theory is no exception.
The first set of arguments in this section provide more justifications
for this assertion and show that Austin's views on jurisprudence are the
work of a staunch positivist, inspired by Bentham breathing the air of
positivism that permeated his own age. As Austin went on determining
the province of jurisprudence and thereby rejecting candidates one after
another, scholars observed the process with a fine sense of naivet6 and
made judgments on the basis of Austinian terms; they failed to see the
positivist orientation of Austin, whose undertaking obviously coupled
with other reasons. Once this is shown, the "true Austin" emerges to judge
the WTO and excludes the organization from the province of jurisprudence.
Austin had the vision to construct a science of jurisprudence free from
the cobwebs of moral considerations. While igniting his passion to
frame a science of jurisprudence, life in the neighborhood of Bentham,
James, and John Stuart Mill put Austin in the prevailing philosophical
radicalism-utilitarianism. 87 Austin joined Bentham in the revolt against
the nebulous conception of natural law and sought to expel it altogether
from the parlance of political philosophy. The main focus of their scheme
was to demarcate law from morals, law being the will of a supreme
sovereign. As it was the will of a sovereign they called this law positive
law.88 At this juncture, the much criticized Austinian version of sovereignty
was born.
The initial impression of the Austinian theory of sovereignty is that it
is power-oriented. However, there is no such power orientation at the
core of Austinian sovereignty. Back in the late nineteenth century, John
Dewey had expressed skepticism with regard to the power-orientation in
Austin's theory. 9 For example, Dewey termed the Austinian conception
of sovereignty as understood by the scholarship "Austinian myth."9° It
was mythical for two reasons: first, sovereignty was confused with the
87. For a biographical sketch of Austin, see JOSEPH HAMBURGER & LOTTE
HAMBURGER, TROUBLED LIVES: JOHN AND SARAH AUSTIN (1985).
88. See HART, supra note 6, at 223-26.
89. See generally John Dewey, Austin's Theory of Sovereignty, 9 POL. Sci. Q. 31
(1894).
90. Id. at 31.
"organs of its exercise;" 9' and second, a sovereign was understood as a
determinate and common superior receiving habitual obedience and not
in habitual obedience to a determinate superior.
92
Dewey subjected the second reason to a detailed analysis. Austin's
sovereign, although receiving habitual obedience, was not in the habit of
obedience to any determinate superior. Later, Austin conceded that
sovereigns habitually deferred to the sentiments of the masses. Why
then, asked Dewey, did those masses become sovereign? Dewey provisionally
dismissed his skepticism by saying that since the masses were an
indeterminate body, they could not become the sovereign.93 However,
this whole exercise confirmed that Austin's theory of sovereignty had a
social dimension and; if the question of determinateness was absent, a mass
social movement would have become the sovereign because politically
determinate sovereigns defer to the sentiments of the masses. 94 If so, as
it was subject to the sentiments of the masses, no political organ could
become a sovereign. What then did Austin intend by "sovereign?" Here
it should be conceded that all that Austin required was a source from
which a command could emanate so that it constituted "law in the strict
sense," and he fulfilled this requirement by postulating a sovereign.95 In
this task he might have been inspired by Bentham during their joint-
venture days on the separation of law and morals. Bentham's conception of
a sovereign acquiring powers from a social situation appeared to be the
96
rationale behind Austin's social dimension. Lest the symmetrical
construction appear a bit artificial, one should consider that the social
thesis-law as originating from a social construction-has been the core
of legal positivism and Austin and Bentham its staunch adherents. In
sum, the Austinian sovereign could be construed as a social force-a
determinate superior-from which emanates the commands and organizational
forms through which the sovereign exercises its power. This sovereign
force receives habitual obedience through the organizations and systems
that it has created; the moment another social force takes its place, it
loses its habitual obedience, and the new force and the institutions and
systems it creates become the sovereign.
For the forces to qualify as a sovereign, however, they must be determinate.
According to Dewey, this was the core test of Austinian sovereignty,
91. Id. at 34.
92. Id. at 36.
93. Susan Minot Woody, The Theory of Sovereignty: Dewey Versus Austin, 78
ETHICS 313, 314 (1968). See also Dewey supra note 89.
94. See Dewey, supra note 89, at 37.
95. Woody, supra note 93, at 317.
96. See generally Neil Duxbury, Why English Jurisprudence is Analytical, in
CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 2004 1 (Jane Holder et.al. eds., 2005).
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although, he maintained that what constitutes determinate must not be
subject to any kind of numerical evaluations, e.g., sovereignty as vested
in a government. 97 Dewey's contention was that what is determinate
is a matter lying quite outside the range of Austin's theory; [determinate sovereigns]
exist precisely because large social forces, working through extensive periods of
time, have fixed [them] as organs of expression. It is these forces, gradually
crystallizing, which have determined governments and given them all specific
(determinate) character which they now possess. 98
D. Gerber offered a methodological defense for Austin's definitions.
Commenting on Dewey, as well as the reply to Dewey by Susan Woody,99
Gerber maintained that Austin's definitions cannot be viewed as mirroring
ordinary language. 1°0 Austin was working on "general jurisprudence" so as
to provide a vocabulary for describing a legal system.101 In the context of a
sovereign "[Austin] was systematizing, and, for that, ordinary language
just will not do; with the introduction of each of his definitions is a further
indication of a constructive inclination."102
The issue of determinateness and the ensuing "unverifiableness" of the
sovereign is a result of another mythical interpretation, for nowhere does
Austin stress the notion of determinateness as requiring sovereignty to
inhere in a specific number of persons. It is a mistake to consider Austin's
definitional statements as "empirical generalizations" or as entailing
normative units. They are only definitions, yet they lay down uses.'
0 3
The cumulative effect of these arguments is to bring more coherence
to Austinian wisdom, as they dispel the myth and justify the social
dimension of his concept of a sovereign. Austin was a positivist sprouted
and grown in the shade of Benthamite philosophy, although he was not
to remain in that shade forever.
97. Dewey, supra note 89, at 37-38.
98. Id. at41.
99. Woody, supra note 93.
100. D. Gerber, A Note on Woody on Dewey on Austin, 79 ETHICS 303, 306 (1969).
Gerber's central contention is reflected in the following passage: "Austin's terms are
introduced by the use of the ordinary terms with which we are all already familiar. They
are picked and chosen from the rather inchoate, or at the very least 'open,' texture of
ordinary language, selected in hopes of developing a clearer language for the domain of
jurisprudence. They are not quite stipulative, since the uses which they lay down are not
arbitrary or capricious; but they do lay down uses. The truth of what they assert is
independent of any facts about the nonlinguistic world. They are, obviously, true by the
definition." Id. at 304-05.
101. Id. at 305.
102. Id. at 304.
103. Id. at 305.
Once he had established a link with Bentham, Austin proceeded to
"depoliticise" Benthamite jurisprudence.'0 4 Austin's pre-professorship days
in Germany had a substantial impact on him;' °5 "his exposure to German
jurisprudence reinforced his drive for the systematization and classification
of law."' 0 6 The subsequent lectures he delivered on jurisprudence that later
became Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832) came with a large
dose of his German influence and essentially appeared as a taxonomy for
law.10 7 It is true that Austin could not attract a large audience to his lectures
and critics normally ascribe this to the weaknesses in Austin's theory.
However, it was not the failure of Austin but rather a failure on the part
of scholars to reconcile Austin's farsightedness with the epistemic culture
present in the Victorian universities in the first half of the nineteenth
century.1
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As knowledge "hardened" towards the late nineteenth century, university
culture also underwent changes. In jurisprudence, among other disciplines,
it became essential to present clear and precise definitions for "leading
terms" and explanations for "fundamental conceptions." The solution to
meeting this need was obvious-Austinian jurisprudence.10 9
On January 1, 1995, the date on which the WTO was established,
international lawyers, in particular international trade lawyers, "apparently
told Austin's ghost to haunt other areas of the international realm."' 10 At
least for the WTO, though not for all of international law, Austin had
gone to rest in peace, and there would no longer be any need to be
defensive with regard to the Austinian test. In one sense, this should be
a source of solace for contemporary international lawyers, for unlike
their predecessors they have a case to put forward in their "debates" on the
legality of international law with municipal lawyers. The situation attracts
attention in as much as a dramatic utterly unprecedented event has in
international law. This point, begs further justifications. Hence, revisiting
Austinian perceptions on international law becomes inevitable.
In the context of international law, Austin opined that:
The so called law of nations consists of opinions or sentiments current among
nations generally. It therefore is not law properly so called. But one supreme
government may doubtless command another to forebear from a kind of conduct
which the law of nations condemns. And, though it is fashioned on law which
104. See generally Duxbury, supra note 96, at 43.
105. John Stuart Mill, Autobiography (1873), available at http://www.utilitarianism.com
/millauto/five.html.
106. See Wilfred E. Rumble, Introduction to JOHN AUSTIN, supra note 8, at ix.
107. See Duxbury, supra note 96, at 44.
108. Id. at 45-47.
109. Id. at 46.
110. Raj Bhala & Lucienne Attard, Austin's Ghost and DSU Reform, 37 INT'L LAW.
651, 653 (2003).
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is improperly so called, this command is law in the proper significations of the
term. Speaking precisely, the command is a rule of positive morality set by a
determinate author. 1 I I
Here, Austin ascribed the element of command to international law but
did not dispute the determinateness of the sovereign. He specifically
excluded international law from the category of law proper because
"[t]he government commanding does not command in its character of
political superior. If the government receiving the command were in a
state of subjection to the other, the command though fashioned on the
law of nations, would amount to a positive law."
' 12
The absence of sanctions is another major lacuna in international law
that Austin pointed out. Since no evil is attached to its command,
international law cannot be a law in the proper signification of the
term." 13 In sum, the two elements of his theory that Austin could not find in
international law were a sovereign in the nature of a political superior
and sanctions attached to the sovereign's command.
In his Whewell lectures, Sir Henry Summer Maine accused Austin of
showing an eagerness to diminish the imperative force of international
law. l l4 If this accusation is accepted, it is because something branded a
naturalist credo of the time like international law could only fall outside
the realm of law in Austin's scientific rearrangement. However, there is
a point in Austin's theory that is favorable to international law; namely,
considering the social dimension in his theory, if the social forces become
the sovereign then Austin should concede that behind every international
law formation there is a sovereign power that functions through political
superiors. Given the fact that international law formation in Austin's
day was on a strikingly low level, he cannot be indicted for a serious
misrepresentation of the facts.
In the WTO, what would have evoked the curiosity of Austin is the
so-called sanctioning power of the DSB-compensation and suspensions
of concession-and to some extent the sovereignty claimed to be present
in the organization.
111. AUSTIN, supra note 8, at 124 (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 124-25.
113. Id.
114. See HENRY SUMNER MAINE, THE WHEWELL LECTURES: INTERNATIONAL LAW A
SERIES OF LECTURES DELVERED BEFORE THE UNiVERSrrY OF CAMBRIDGE (1887), available at
http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/-econ/ugcm/3113/maine/intlaw.htm, in particular Lectures I
and II.
Austin conceptualized a command as follows:
A command is distinguished from other significations of desire, not by the style
in which the desire is signified, but by the power and purpose of the party
commanding to inflict an evil or pain in case the desire is disregarded. If you
cannot or will not harm me in case I comply not with your wish, the expression
of your wish is not a command, although you utter your wish in imperative
phrase. If you are able and willing to harm me in case I comply not with your
wish, the expression of your wish amounts to a command, although you are
prompted by a spirit of courtesy to utter it in the shape of a request.
1 5
Austin thus required two components in a command-power, i.e.,
physical capacity or authority," 6 and the ability to cause injury to the
non-complying party.
The following two clauses of the DSU may meet Austin's requirements:
1. Prompt compliance with recommendations or rulings of the DSB is
essential in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the
benefit of all Members (Art. 21(l))117
2. If the Member concerned fails to bring the measure found to be
inconsistent with a covered agreement into compliance therewith or
otherwise comply with the recommendations and rulings within the
reasonable period of time ... such member shall... enter into negotiations
with any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures, with
a view to developing mutually acceptable compensation. If no satisfactory
compensation has been agreed within 20 days after the date of expiry
of the reasonable period of time, any party having invoked the dispute
settlement procedures may request authorization from the DSB to
suspend the application to the Member concerned of concessions or
other obligations under the covered agreements (Art.22.2).118
The first clause (Art.21.2) has imperative language but the second, which
speaks of compensation, sounds like a bit of a clich. 11 9 Certainly, Austin
was least concerned about the imperativeness in the language of the
command; he only required the ability to inflict harm. Where a member
fails to compensate another member it has aggrieved, the DSU authorizes
the aggrieved party to retaliate by suspending concessions or obligations.
Although the offending member is required to seek authorization for
taking such an action, the negative consensus involved in decision-making
results in that request being automatically granted. Would this be more
in keeping with Austin's "harm?" Powers akin to this are also vested in
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), where sanctions are still a
collective action; under the DSB it is a bilateral state-to-state affair. Now,
what if the member to suspend a concession is an economically weak country
and the one against whom the sanction is sought is an economically
115. AUSTIN, supra note 8, at 21.
116. See generally Colin Tapper, Austin on Sanctions, 24 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 271 (1965).
117. DSU 21(1).
118. Id. art. 22(2) (emphasis added).
119. See Bhala & Attard, supra note 110, at 663.
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powerful one? Such a measure might have some side effects on the weaker
state. 120 What is more, according to one commentator, even the remedy of
compensation under the WTO lacks the "traditional sense of compensation
for damages."' 121 Another author lamented: "[T]here is no prospect of
incarceration, injunctive relief, damages for harm inflicted or police
enforcement. The WTO has no jailhouse, no bail bondsmen, no blue
helmets, no truncheons or tear gas.' 22 Clearly, measures available in the
WTO are incongruous with Austin's theory of command and punishment.
123
The second factor that ousted international law from the province of
jurisprudence is the absence of a sovereign in the form of a political
superior. Would Austin have found such a political superior in the
WTO?
A sovereign for Austin was a person or body that is politically superior,
i.e., that possessed supreme power; "this power is infinite in number and
kind," partly activated and partly lying "dormant" in the sovereign.
124
The sovereign delegates these powers to political subordinates or immediate
partakers in those very powers.' 25 These powers are called subordinate
powers. 126 In Austin's scheme of things (it should be conjectured)
international law has neither of these attributes. What then would be the
case with the WTO? Regrettably, Austin made any determination complex
by not making explicit the nature of the supreme powers that a sovereign
should have, although he did provide examples of various legal systems
to illustrate a sovereign. He also did not clarify how sovereigns happen
to acquire these powers; he essentially dismissed the question by saying
120. For more information, see Pauwelyn, supra note 40, at 345.
121. Id. at 339. However, considering the drawbacks present in the compensation
system, the Consultative Board's Report on the Future of the WTO (Sutherland Report)
has highlighted the importance of monetary compensation to replace the compensatory
market access measures currently granted to the winning aggrieved disputant. Consultative
Board, The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium,
(2004) available at, www.wto.org/English/thewto e/10anniv e/future wto e.pdf. For
an evaluation of the Sutherland Report, see Mitsuo Matsushita, The Sutherland Report and its
Discussion of Dispute Settlement Reforms, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 623 (2005).
122. Judith Hippler Bello, Editorial Comment, The WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding: Less Is More, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 416, 417 (1996).
123. A further effort to raise the quality standard of the WTO's enforcement
mechanism to meet Austin's requirements is articulated in Bhala & Attard, supra note
110, at 661-67. But see Raj Bhala, WTO Dispute Settlement and Austin's Positivism: A
Primer on the Intersection, 9 INT'L TRADE L. REG., 14-25 (2003).
124. AUSTIN, supra note 8, at 199.
125. Id.
126. Id.
that those powers are partly dormant and partly activated. 27 At this juncture,
a focus on the social dimension of Austinian sovereignty, as discussed
earlier, appears to be a more reasonable course. If Austinian sovereignty
is to be construed as a social force that exercises its sovereign powers
through various agencies such as government and other organizations,
the WTO will fit into the category of a subordinate to the sovereign. Not
surprisingly, this is tantamount to the Benthamite position that a
subordinate's powers are conferred by the sovereign. 128 This situation
will only make the political and social forces that created the WTO a
political superior and the organization its subordinate.
Ultimately, like Bentham, Austin would also have maintained an
unfavorable view of the WTO in regard to its inclusion in the realm of
positive law. None of the institutional features or the so called "hard"
mechanisms of the WTO could fulfill Austin's requirements. Any
reproach that Austin imposed unfeasible requirements would not hold
water, for Austin was only acting as a positivist of his time, however
radical.
C. Hart and his Rule Theory
In this section, the same method of analysis, as applied earlier for Bentham
and Austin, is followed by portraying Hart's version of rule-based
positive theory and then viewing the WTO through the prism of rule
theory.
Hart was the first scholar to undertake the study of legal positivism in
a philosophical perspective. 29 His concept of law was firmly rooted in
the two basic tenets of positivism-the separability thesis and the social
thesis. 30 In regard to the separability thesis, Hart did not adhere to the
Austinian view that it is the coercive nature of law that differentiates it
from morals; according to Hart, attributing coercive nature was a
mischaracterization of the purpose and function of law.' 3' He rejected
the contentions that law is a coercive order and that law is a moral
command. Hart's adherence to the separability thesis came in the form
of his "rule theory," according to which every mature legal system is a
combination of two sets of rules-primary and secondary-with primary
127. See id.
128. See supra at 24.
129. Frederick Schauer, Book Review, (Re)Taking Hart, 119 HARV. L. REV. 852,
856 (2006). Although Hart's predecessors, e.g., Bentham and Austin, philosophized law,
their postulations were based more on political theories and other wide-ranging thinking.
See AUSTN, supra note 8, at 858-59.
130. See generally Hart, supra note 59.
131. See generally HART, supra note 28, at 18-25.
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rules laying down ways of conduct and secondary rules validating the
primary rules. 1
32
Although a passing reference was made to primary and secondary
rules while describing Hart's position on the skepticism of the legality of
international law, it only served that context and a more detailed treatment
of Hart's rule theory is in order to set up an analysis of the existential
logic of an institution like the WTO.
Primary rules are rather mundane in human society, for they are verbal
prescriptions that aim to guide the behavior of actors. A society with
only rules of this type is likely to face three problems: 1) uncertainty as
to the determination of valid rules; 2) a static character resulting in decay, as
there is no means to eliminate old rules and introduce new ones; and
3) ine ficiency in settling disputes and imposing sanctions in an organized
way.' These problems can be remedied through secondary rules. For
each defect, there are different types of secondary rules: the problem of
uncertainty can be remedied by means of the rule of recognition, which
determines the criteria that govern the validity of the rules of the system;
the problem of static character is resolved by rules of change, which
regulate the process of change by conferring the power to enact legislation
in accordance with specified procedures; and the problem of inefficiency
can be solved by way of rules of adjudication, which confer competence
on officials to decide on alleged wrongs and to impose sanctions. 3 4 All
three secondary rules are required to convert a society having primary
rules alone into a complete legal system. In other words, no society that
lacks one or all of these features cans constitute a legal system, and the
laws of any so-called legal system that lacks these features are not laws.
Hart's rule theory is by no means a crude formulation that easily flexes
for any application. The two-tier system of primary and secondary rules
that Hart demanded in a legal system involves certain intricacies in its
application to the WTO. The cause of this difficulty is largely that the
rules in the WTO resemble a complete legal system in having both primary
and secondary rules existing in tandem. At first sight, this may seem to
be an encouraging picture of the WTO, but it is a misconception. In the
next section, this paper will first attempt to dispel the misconception by
exposing the true nature of the WTO rules and will argue that the system
of primary rules in the WTO is a covering closer in character to secondary
132. See id.
133. Id. at 89-91.
134. Id. at 91-96.
rules. Then the paper will reveal that there is nothing in the WTO that
Hart did not include in international law.
International law, according to Hart, lacks an international legislature,
courts with compulsory jurisdiction, centrally organized sanctions and,
above all, a unifying rule of recognition specifying the "sources" of law
and a general criterion for the identification of its rules. 135 The absence
of these features means that international law resembles a simple form of
social structure consisting only of primary rules. 136 In other words, international
law suffers from the deficiencies of uncertainty, static character, and
inefficiency. If the WTO should bring with it rules of recognition, change,
and adjudication, it could remedy the deficiencies and thus fit into
Hartian rule theory.
However, before moving in this line, a certain question must be
resolved. Should the WTO be considered as a possible remedy that
solves the problem of the absence of secondary rules in international
law? In that case, it must be presupposed that the WTO constitutes a
system of secondary rules only. In the alternative, if the WTO is a separate
legal system comprising primary and secondary rules, the WTO must be
a self-contained regime distinct from international law and, consequently,
not an instance of thickened normativity in international law. The question
regarding the self-contained nature of the WTO has been of recent
concern, 137 although the organization's kinship with international law
has been positively asserted much earlier.'
38
Recent studies conducted in connection with the International Law
Commission's Special Study Group on the Fragmentation of International
Law revealed that the WTO does not have the status of a self-contained
regime independent of international law.' 39 Although this is reassuring,
one point regarding the nature of WTO agreements begs clarification:
Do all WTO agreements confer power, and are thus secondary rules in
character? If not, are there any rules that impose duties making them in
effect primary rules? If this doubt is not clarified, Hart's rule theory
135. Id. at 209.
136. Id.
137. This question has mainly come to light in the wake of the alleged fragmentation of
international law. In response to the allegation, the International Law Commission
established a Special Group on the Fragmentation of International Law in 2002, chaired
by Martti Koskenniemi. See Gen. Assembly [GAOR], Int'l Law Comm'n, Report of the
Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law, U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/L.628 (Aug. 1,
2002). See also Anja Lindroos, Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal
System: The Doctrine ofLex Specialis, 74 NoRDIc J. INT'L L. 27 (2005).
138. See generally Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the
WTO: How Far Can We Go?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 535 (2001).
139. For a discourse on why the WTO is not a self-contained regime, see Anja
Lindroos & Michael Mehling, Dispelling the Chimera of 'Self-Contained Regimes'
International Law and the WTO, 16 EuR. J. INT'L L. 857 (2005).
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could be used as a ground to invoke the self-contained regime nature of
the WTO all over again, for the presence of primary rules in tandem with
secondary rules presupposes the existence of a complete legal system.
To answer this, the types of agreements in the WTO must be considered.
The whole WTO architecture is based on one agreement-the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement).
This agreement has various annexes and sub-annexes, e.g., various
agreements on trade in goods, agreements on trade in services (GATS)
intellectual property (TRIPs), and dispute settlement (DSU). 140 These
agreements spell out a variety of substantive rights and obligations of
members. The decisive question is: If these agreements impose rights
and obligations on members, are they not primary rules? The importance of
this question is heightened by the presence of definitive judicial power
(that generally follows these kinds of rights and obligations) in the DSB,
and it is substantiated by the fact that under GATT, which lacked a
dispute settlement body of judicial character, the prescriptions of its
legal text were seen only as "standards" prescribing tariff quotas for the
contracting parties. The situation urges further clarification.
Although there was a "system transposition" from GATT to the WTO,
a new context and an altogether different mood awaited the WTO: it was
a transformation of the legal framework towards multilateral trade
liberalization. At the outset of this process, the WTO had to confront a
set of practices in the form of domestic policies, which, although not
discriminatory in any specific sense, nevertheless undermined trade
liberalization measures. 41 Subsidies, dumping, and technical "barriers"
were just some of these practices. This situation generated normative
ambiguity, which was addressed by a set of new rules on subsidies,
anti-dumping, intellectual property, technical barriers, and the like.
142
However, the new rules were in many respects different from those in
GATT. To quote Robert Howse: "[T]hese rules cannot easily be seen as
general 'standards' . . . . They often have the character of detailed legal
140. For full text of the agreements, see World Trade Organization, Legal Texts-
The WTO Agreements, http://www.wto.org/english/docsellegal ellegal e.htm (last visited
Oct. 16, 2007).
141. Robert Howse, The Legitimacy of the World Trade Organization, in THE
LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 355, 357-59 (Jean-Marc Coicaud &
Veijo Heiskanen eds., 2001).
142. Id.
code, embodying trade-offs between regulatory autonomy and trade
liberalization explicitly negotiated ex ante."'
143
To innocent eyes, this external character of WTO rules resembles a set
of codes imposing obligations and duties, followed by punishments.
This view is rather naYve, and erroneous as well, as becomes apparent
upon a retake of the transformation process from GATT to the WTO.
The transformation was not merely a change in the vocabulary of trade;
it was a cultural and structural change that inter alia changed trading
patterns as well as the "socio-economic framework" for trade.' 44 Trade
transformed to become more "homogenous" among states. 145 At the
objective level, traders turned more inter-reliant. 146 Under such conditions
any kind of trade-impeding domestic policies or protectionist measures-a
"race to the bottom"-could wreck the give-and-take arrangements
between the interdependent states.
To avoid such a situation, predictability in trade behavior became a
crucial need of the time. Here lies the logic of the rule-oriented approach of
the WTO, which established principles of tremendous scope upon which
states, non-state entities, and other global actors could rely.147  The
operational strategy of this rle-oriented system is positive harmonization--the
creation of uniform global regulatory standards. Agreements like TRIPs,
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), and the Agreement
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), to name
a few, reflect this regulatory philosophy. 148 These agreements address the
member countries and require them to adopt certain minimum standards in
their domestic regulations. Although the agreements speak the language of
duties and obligations, their philosophical base lies in "positive
harmonization."' 149 Even in Hart's scheme of rules, the secondary rules,
although power-conferring in nature, are in the form of addresses to
officials. The nature of the scheme is determined not by the terminology,
but by its connection with the primary rules in ascertaining, introducing,
eliminating, and determining violations of it.' 50 This view emphasizes
143. Id. at 358.
144. JANE FORD, A SOCIAL THEORY OF THE WTO: TRADING CULTUREs 42 (2003).
Ford has provided a systematic presentation of the social and economic dimension of the
transformation process from GATT to the WTO. Id. at 41-64.
145. Id. at 56.
146. Id.
147. See JOHN H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO, AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 88-89 (2006).
148. Each of these agreements is analyzed in the light of positive harmonization
philosophy in Veijo Heiskanen, The Regulatory Philosophy of International Trade Law,
38 J. WORLD TRADE 1 (2004).
149. Id. at 34.
150. HART, supra note 28, at 91-92.
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that the nature of WTO rules is akin to that of secondary rules and is far
beyond the scope of primary rules.
Another question is whether the punishment attached to the WTO rules
brings them close to primary rules. This issue is related to the nature of
dispute settlement in the WTO. The DSU declares that its role is a
central element in ensuring predictability and security to the multilateral
trading system. 151 In emphasizing the role of the DSU, the panel in US-
Section 301 Trade Act ruled: "Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of
the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability
of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place
and its different operators."' 52 In this task, the DSB facilitates the WTO
in carrying out its objectives by grappling with the infringement of the
harmonization obligations contained in the covered agreements. Moreover,
there is no aspect of a trial in DSB proceedings and its rulings are not
sentences; instead, it facilitates compliance with the standards that have
been infringed. The DSU leaves no ambiguity in this regard: "[t]he aim
of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a
dispute" and the preferred solution is one mutually acceptable to the
parties.' Obviously, in the case of a failure to obtain a mutually acceptable
solution, the WTO authorizes retaliatory measures. These measures are
occasionally referred to as those "inducing compliance"' 5 4 and are thus
reformatory in nature. However, WTO practice on retaliation reveals that
this point of view is incorrect. 155 Although retaliation under the WTO
dispute settlement system is far from the restoration of the "balance of
concessions" policy of GATT, it is essentially like a measure for the
"maintenance" of equilibrium in the multilateral trading system and in
all probability is incompatible with the notion of a punishment.
The WTO now must face the test of providing the missing elements of
secondary rules for international law-the rules of adjudication, change,
and recognition.
Can one find the characteristics of rules of adjudication in the DSB?
The answer requires a specification of the relevant characteristics of
151. DSUart.3(2).
152. Panel Report, United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974,
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999), available at http//www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu_e/cases-e/
ds152 e.htm.
153. DSU art. 3(7).
154. See Arbitral Report, Brazil-Export Financing Programme for Aircraft,
WT/DS46/ARB (Aug. 28, 2000).
155. McGivem, supra note 44, at 145-53.
rules of adjudication. The most simplistic form of such rules should empower
individuals to make "authoritative determinations" as to whether a
primary rule has been broken or not.1 56 In addition, the rules should
identify the individuals who are to adjudicate and the procedures for
such adjudication.1 57 In short, rules of adjudication define a group of
important legal concepts such as judge or court, jurisdiction and judgment. 58
These criteria, in effect, require the WTO to tender evidence as to its judicial
character. Generally, the judicial nature of the WTO is undisputed; the
only contentious issue is its judicial activism.' 59 The WTO's reliance on
the rules of interpretation laid down in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, 1969, and its occasional resort to the principles of
public international law are good examples of its judicial character. 160
Even the Appellate Body of the DSB has emphasized the "precedential
value" of its decisions.' 6' The judicial nature of the WTO is also reflected
in its jurisprudence and in how it fills gaps and clarifies ambiguities. 62
If a rule of adjudication entails no more than a minimalist requirement, as
stated above, then the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO meets
the criterion. This acceptance would, however, question Hart's wisdom
in rejecting international law, which was not devoid of an adjudicative
organ. Indeed, Hart in all probability was aware of the adjudicatory role
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and its predecessor, the Permanent
Court of International Justice (PCIJ). Hart's rejection of international
law has more credible grounds than merely the absence of a rule of
adjudication; besides requiring a set of rules for empowering individuals
to make authoritative decisions, Hart sought the reason for such an
authoritative decision-making power being vested in a court or individual.
Such a power, according to Hart, comes from a rule of recognition. 163 In
other words, the WTO's candidacy for the Hartian world of law depends
156. HART, supra note 28, at 94.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. In this connection, see Lorand Bartels, The Separation of Powers in the WTO:
How to Avoid Judicial Activism, 53 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 861 (2004).
160. Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional,
and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 247, 250 (2004).
161. Id. at 254. For a detailed study of the application of precedents in WTO
decision-making, see Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade
Law (Part One of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 845 (1999); Raj Bhala, The
Precedent Setters: De Facto Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Two of a Trilogy),
9 FLA. ST. U. J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (1999); Raj Bhala, The Power of the Past:
Towards de Jure Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Three of a Trilogy), 33 GEO.
WASH. INT'L L. REv. 873 (2001).
162. Steinberg, supra note 160, at 52-53.
163. HART, supra note 28, at 95.
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on the existence of a rule of recognition that validates the dispute
settlement system under it.
Before attending to this issue, the second requirement of rule theory
must be examined and the extent to which the WTO is receptive to change
must be determined. In other words, are there any rules of change in the
WTO? The identification of such rules, according to Hart, lies in the
form of a rule that "empowers an individual or body of persons to
introduce new primary rules ... and eliminate old rules."'' In plain
terms, Hart required a legislative act.
The first provision of interest is Article III of the WTO Agreement,
which is generally presented as the one that upholds the traditional
theory of separation of powers, albeit within an organization. 65 Article
111.2 appears to be the clause on legislative power:
The WTO shall provide the forum for negotiations among its Members
concerning their multilateral trade relations in matters dealt with under the
agreements in the Annexes to this Agreement. The WTO may also provide a
forum for further negotiations among its Members concerning their multilateral
trade relations, and a framework for the implementation of the results of such
negotiations, as may be decided by the Ministerial Conference. 166
This power exists in addition to the lawmaking power vested in the
autonomous judicial body of the WTO.167 Such a coexistence of legislative
and judicial functions throws the aura of a constitutional system around
the WTO. Yet, there is room for skepticism: Can the so-called lawmaking
power of the WTO as manifested in Article 111.2 be equated with a
legislative process? Does not the "forum for negotiation," as characterized
by Armin von Bogdandy, sound more like the international exercise of
public functions than a legislative act? 168 First, a survey of the Agreements
reveals that no rule exists that speaks clearly of the legislative competency
of the WTO. Second, it has been argued that WTO rules are mere
standards of good behavior in macro-economic policy and international
trade that states want to follow as a "seal of good house-keeping.
' 69
164. Id. at 93.
165. Armin von Bogdandy, Law and Politics in the WTO: Strategies to Cope with a
Deficient Relationship, 5 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 609, 617 (2001).
166. WTO Agreement, art. 111.2 (emphasis added).
167. Id. art. 111.3.
168. Bogdandy, supra note 165, at 618.
169. Nicholas Bayne, International Economic Organizations: More Policy Making
Less Autonomy, in AUTONOMOUS POLICY MAKING BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
195, 199 (Bob Reinalda & Bertjan Verbeek eds., 1998). However, Bayne opines that no
government wants to defy the WTO.
Such views do not attribute any substantial legal value to WTO rules;
they reflect global trends. Third, it has been alleged that WTO rulemaking
undermines democratic values, as the lawmaking system in the organization
does not allow the state to intervene in the body of law and transform
it.170 Von Bogdandy is even more critical: "The WTO undermines the
positivity of law in this sense. Once a treaty is set up, the political grasp
on its rules is severely restricted-not normatively but in all practical
terms."'171 This deficiency renders the so-called legislative act in Article
111.2 "anti-legislative" in a constitutional sense. Weak resistance to the
third view appears in the form of the amending power of the WTO rules
vested in the members.' 72  However, this only makes the powers in
Article 111.2 a legislative power in the traditional international law sense
such as, where Article 108 of the U.N. Charter invests amending power
in the U.N. members.
7 3
Proponents of the WTO's lawmaking power might have considered it
futile to hunt for a legislature hiding behind its clauses, much as was the
case with elevating the WTO's procedures to constitutional legislative
actions. Hence, they focused their efforts on highlighting the judicial
lawmaking in the WTO.
The WTO's judicial lawmaking is evident from the frenetic activity of
the Panels and the Appellate Body, 174 and it finds endorsement in scholarly
writings. 75 However, what would enthuse Hart is the dynamism of the
DSB, i.e., the transformative role it plays by providing rules of change to
the system. One example of the transformative role of the DSB is the
standard of review, although the practice is not transformative in a
municipal law sense.176 However, in an international context, the standard
of review represents dynamism and is, to some extent, transformative in
nature. This is because in an international forum like the WTO,
lawmaking is more of a diplomatic process-a manifestation of the
policies and interests of various sovereign states. Moreover, a review,
170. Bogdandy, supra note 165, at 620
171. Id.
172. WTO Agreement, art. X.
173. Bogdandy, supra note 165, at 623.
174. For a statistical account of the work of the DSB, see WTO Dispute Settlement
Statistics, http://www.wto.org/English/tratope/dispu_e/stats_e.htm. To make a comparison
with GATT dispute settlement, see Robert Hudec, Daniel Kennedy, & Mark Sgarbossa,
A Statistical Profile of GA7T Dispute Settlement Cases 1948-1989, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 4 (1993).
175. See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 160.
176. Generally, standard of review is a procedure meant to analyze the level of
deference given to the decision reviewed. The reviewing authority normally focuses on
whether 1) there is a discretionary ruling, 2) there is abuse of discretion, and 3) there is
an error in the decision. See generally Kelly Kunsch, Standard of Review (State and
Federal): A Primer, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 11 (1994).
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rather than being an appraisal of the panel reports, takes the form of a
relative assessment of the state policies and the judicial application of
such policies. 177 The difference vis-A-vis the standard of review of a
municipal court is that while an appellate municipal court assesses the
discretion, abuse of discretion, or errors involved in the judgment of a
subordinate court and thereby shows deference to the will of one single
entity-the national legislature-in an international body like WTO, the
standard of review by the Appellate Body not only defers to the sentiments
of sovereign states but, in effect, puts to the test the "judiciability'1 78 of
state interests. Lack ofjudiciability is an indication of the inadequacy of
the organization's rules, which are designed to ensure security and
predictability in a multilateral trading system. To put it simply, if a rule
leads to arbitrariness or discretionary use by the Panels, it means that,
despite the rule, state interests are divergent on the area of the multilateral
trading system addressed by the rule, and that the rule requires
transformation. This view is supported by the fact that the very objective of
the standard of review in WTO law is to facilitate the organization in
accomplishing the ultimate objective of ensuring security and predictability
in a multilateral trading system.179 At this point, the standard of review
acts as an agent of change. All these assertions are notwithstanding the
accusations regarding intrusion into national sovereignty by an international
court, which is manifested to a high degree in the WTO's case.' 80
Apart from the standard of review, there is no strong case for likening
the WTO's rules to Hart's rules of change. The robust activity of the
Panels and Appellate Body, although it constitutes a weak case, can at
best be equated with the work of the ICJ and other international adjudicative
bodies that have been dynamic in their respective roles.
177. For details on the standard of review in the WTO, see Claus-Dieter Ehlermann
& Nicolas Lockhart, Standard of Review in WTO Lav, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 491, 494-498
(2004). For a conceptual approach, see Stefan Zleptnig, The Standard of Review in WTO
Law: An Analysis of Law, Legitimacy and the Distribution of Legal and Political
Authority, 6 EUR. INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS (2002), http://eiop.or.at/ eiop/pdf/2002-
017.pdf. See also Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures,
Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193
(1996).
178. The expression "judiciability" denotes wider judicial criteria and is not limited
to "courtworthiness." It includes the validity, content, objectivity, relevance/contextual
significance of a law for being invoked in a dispute, as well as other features that make a
law a rule to be relied on for dispute settlement.
179. Ehlermann & Lockhart, supra note 177.
180. See, e.g., Chander, supra note 34.
Even assuming that the WTO gains credit here, Hart would have
pitied those making this claim, just as he pitied those scholars who
asserted the existence of a legislative act in international law by pointing
to its institutional apparatus.181 The source of Hart's sympathy was his
conviction that the mere existence of rules without a rule of recognition
was illogical. 182 In other words, both rules of adjudication and rules of
change must be validated by a rule of recognition.
In his Concept of Law, Hart presented the rule of recognition in a dual
role. It made its first appearance as a remedy to overcome the uncertainty
permeating the regime of primary rules; this uncertainty stemmed from
the lack of established procedure for determining whether a particular
rule belongs to the set of primary rules. A rule of recognition in the form of
a rule stating that all valid laws are inscribed in an existing text solves
the problem of uncertainty.1 83 In this context, the rule of recognition is
of the same genre as rules of adjudication and change.
The rule of recognition makes a reappearance when Hart criticizes the
notion of a legally unlimited sovereign.184 There he uses it as a concept
to validate a legal system. However, Hart is heedful in not letting the
concept of the rule of recognition fall into the Kelsinian "Grundnorm"
or become a mere meta-legal abstraction. 185 He criticizes the general
conception that the legal validity of rules of recognition cannot be
demonstrated, and asserts that although the rule of recognition is not
expressly stated anywhere, it can be identified from the practice of courts
and other legal authorities. According to Hart, statements made about a
particular statute in the day-to-day life of a legal system by judges,
lawyers, or ordinary citizens carry with them certain presuppositions.
86
These presuppositions are of two types: one is that the statements made
about the validity of a given rule are "internal statements of law," which
express the point of view of those who make the statement; the other is
that the person making the statement not only accepts the validity of the
law but also accepts the fact that there is a rule of recognition actually
181. HART, supra note 28, at 227.
182. Id. at 93. ("There will be a very close connexion between the rules of change
and the rules of recognition: for where the former exist the latter will necessarily
incorporate a reference to legislation as an identifying feature of the rules .... ").
183. Although this form of rule of recognition fits only into a simple form of legal
system, it brings with it many elements distinctive of law. In the case of a developed
legal system, instead of being identified exclusively by reference to a text, rules of
recognition are marked by some general characteristic possessed by the primary rules.
Generally, rules of recognition may take the form of a legislative enactment, customary
practice, general declarations of specified persons, or past judicial decisions. For details,
see HART, supra note 28, at 92-93, 97.
184. Id. at 97-120.
185. Id. at 108.
186. 1d. at 109.
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accepted and employed in the general operation of the system, this being
the rule's external aspect. 1
87
This account of the rule of recognition in terms of an internal and external
aspect complicates the concept. On the whole, the rule of recognition in
its second manifestation sounds like an abstraction that is arrived at
inductively from observations, but is not itself observable.' 88 Yet, the
dual role is not confusing, except for the use of the same terminology for
qualitatively different concepts-one a type of secondary rule to determine
the valid rules in a system and the other a concept validating the legal
system. Hart suitably engineered a connection between the two concepts:
"[I]n the simple operation of identifying a given rule as possessing the
required feature of being an item on an authoritative list of rules we have
the germ of the idea of legal validity.' 89
A rule of recognition having the quality to validate a legal system is
referred to as an "ultimate rule." The rules of adjudication, rules of
change, and rules of recognition need to be validated by the existence of
an ultimate rule of recognition.
This picture of Hartian rule theory is doubtless a bit disappointing to
scholars who cherish the institutional features of the WTO as the hard
part of international law. The assorted evidence for the hard nature of WTO
in tangible form, e.g., judicial characteristics, legislative features and
well-inscribed procedures, still falls short of Hart's requirements, which
demand validations for that evidence at higher abstract levels. However,
a final effort is made here to see whether the WTO could meet this
requirement.
To make a complete legal system requires secondary rules of recognition,
change, and adjudication validated by an ultimate rule. The above
assessment of the WTO's institutional machinery revealed only the
existence of adjudicatory, legislative, and procedural rules. The common
approach for ascertaining the existence of an ultimate rule is the chain of
legal reasoning of validating one rule by pointing to another rule, as
endorsed by Hart. However, having worked thus far on an assumption
that the WTO is a system of secondary rules, there is no further validating
rule substantiating the criteria for those rules. What is present are only
facts-social and political. For Bentham and Austin this situation would
187. For the discussion, see id. at 105-07.
188. Here, too, Hart has objections to saying that the validity of a rule of recognition
cannot be demonstrated. See id.
189. Id. at 93.
have been acceptable. However, Hart would not have looked upon this
situation favorably, for it takes the question of the validity of law back to
metaphysics and the Grundnorm.
Accordingly, while making his assertions regarding international law,
Hart felt that there was something comic in the search for a rule of
recognition,190 inasmuch as no such rule exists for international law.
Yet, he considered the question of multilateral treaties only to dismiss it
by saying that treaties do not have universal acceptance and compliance
with them is coincidental, as in a primitive society. Notwithstanding this
conviction, Hart was optimistic:
It is sometimes argued that [multilateral treaties] may bind states that are not
parties. If this were generally recognized, such treaties would in fact be legislative
enactments. And international law would have distinct criteria of validity for its
rules. A basic rule of recognition could then be formulated which would represent
an actual feature of the system and would be more than an empty restatement of
the fact that a set of rules are in fact observed by states. 19 1
One question remains, however: Why did Hart not try to seek the rule
of recognition in international law through the practice of the ICJ, the
PCIJ, and other quasi-adjudicative bodies, or through the statements made
by international lawyers, diplomats, and other officials? In other words,
why did Hart not apply the internal and external aspect, which are vital
for the identification of a rule of recognition? What made him prejudicial in
his approach towards international law?
These are things which are best known only to Hart. However, if
prejudice is his stance, then the WTO has nothing special to offer him.
The WTO has the obvious selling point of the automatic jurisdiction of
its DSB, but this has so far served only as a technique to bring disputes
to the table. This automaticity cannot command automatic compliance.' 92
Regrettably, there is no feature to be found in the WTO that Hart
overlooked in international law that might have prompted him to analyze
that legal order in terms of an internal and external aspect. Yet, the
increasing number of accessions to the WTO, the enhanced compliance
with the rulings of Panels and Appellate Body, the growing harmonization
of trade standards and other post-cold war developments make a rather
good case for international law. However, the WTO as an institution
cannot claim any credit for these developments.
190. Id. at 230.
191. Id.at231.
192. McGivem, supra note 44, at 157.
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D. Summary
The arguments made thus far in this part have sought to demonstrate
that the institutional characteristics of the WTO, if taken in isolation,
have nothing in them that would melt the positivists' age-old coldness
towards international law.1 93 However, this is in no way meant to suggest
to the reader that the WTO is ineffective. It does not imply that there has
not been structural or normative transformation. The three positivists and
their likely rejection of the WTO only reveal that the normative power
which contemporary scholars have witnessed in the WTO and subsequently
designated as Austinian positivism is only a mirage. Moreover, what
contemporary scholars have seen is positivism only in its fundamental form.
Bentham, Austin, and Hart were all staunch adherents to the fundamental
positive tenet that the validity of law depends on certain basic social
facts. 194 Bentham and Austin adhered to this view by postulating a sovereign,
whereas Hart proposed a rule of recognition. Yet, positivism took on
diverse forms in the works of these scholars as a reflection of their times.
Bentham, who breathed the air of utilitarianism, was prepared to go to
any extent of theorizing to achieve utility, even to devise a sanction
theory of law where a sovereign imposes punishment. However, when it
came to the powers of this sovereign, Bentham attributed it to a social
situation and thereby remained faithful to the fundamental positive theory.
Austin's antipathy towards natural law and Benthamite influence prompted
him to postulate a sovereign that formed the source of law; its commands
were law. However, Austin's sovereign, as generally perceived, is not a
power-oriented concept but a social force that receives habitual obedience
through the organizations and systems that it creates. Thus, Austin, too,
arrived at the fundamental positive theory. Hart, unlike his predecessors,
took a different approach towards fundamental positivism. His rule theory
was a result of the alienation of law from morals and a dissatisfaction
with the conception of a legally unlimited sovereign. Accordingly,
he replaced a sovereign with a rule of recognition which validated the
legal system. However, Hart nowhere explicitly equated the rule of
recognition with a social force. In its place, he relied on a "presupposition"
193. The metaphor of coldness in the positivist approach towards international law
finds mention in Stephen Hall, The Persistent Spectre: Natural Law, International Order
and the Limits of Legal Positivism, 12 EuR. J. INT'L L. 269, 271 (2001). Hall borrows
the analogy from LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 232 (rev. ed. 1969).
194. For more on the basic nature of positivism, see RAz, supra note 59.
thesis, whereby the existence of a rule of recognition is based on a
presupposition-"there is a valid rule"--regarding the statements made
by the persons in a legal system about a rule. This presupposition (internal
and external aspect) constituted the validity of law. Hart avoided any
reference to social forces in this regard; yet if he were asked what made
a rule so special that it could validate a legal system by means of a
presupposition, he would have had to confess that the rule is in one
way or another conditioned by social forces. Otherwise, rule theory would
remain devoid of a foundation.
Thus, positivism was practiced by these scholars by remaining truly
faithful to its fundamental form. Utilitarianism, command theory, and rule
theory are various formulations of this fundamental form, each appropriate
to its time. Among these, Austin's account, for the reasons discussed earlier,
developed into the essential representation of positivism with command
theory as its hallmark. It continued to exert its sway, notwithstanding
the changes in positivism, in essentially every branch of law. If what
contemporary scholars have discovered in the WTO is Austinian
positivism, the analysis of Austin's theory ought to have shown an inclination
on his part towards the WTO, but it did not. This failure means that what
scholars have discovered is not Austin's positivism as it is commonly
understood.
On balance, the transformations and the subsequent global changes-
normative and structural--can be attributed to positivism, but only in its
fundamental form, i.e., the social thesis. The impetus for transformations
and the validity of the resultant norms are determined by certain social
forces. That social force was neoliberalism in the present context.
V. THE WTO AND NEOLIBERALISM
A. Neoliberalism: The Landscape
There is no representative definition of the term neoliberalism,
although there are many unofficial ones. Most are predicated on
activism, however, the term is generally used in a pejorative sense and to
oppose the market liberalism that has emerged as a result of globalization.
Activists prefix "neo" because the old liberal idea of free markets is
performed through the compression of the world and the strengthening
of the consciousness of the peoples all over the world. 195 But the term
finds more rational application in the "globalization debates" within
academia, where neoliberalism is considered the ideology of the process of
195. Cf ROLAND ROBERTSON, GLOBALIZATION: SOCIAL THEORY AND GLOBAL CULTURE
8-31 (1992).
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globalization. 196  Such a view generally provides an economic logic
which justifies the emergence of a single global market and upholds the
principle of global competition.' 97 This, in effect, evokes an impression
that the world will act in accordance with economics textbooks. Does
this mean that market forces are going to make every other choice
irrelevant? Yes, but only to a certain extent. This view will be dealt
with in the following paragraphs. For the time being, for tractability's
sake, this paper will proceed with the definition that neoliberalism is a
"global policy regime that comprises free trade and the free flow of
resources via market mechanisms."'
' 98
In order to conceptualize neoliberalism, one must first define its purpose.
Is mere attainment of market expansion all that has been meant by
neoliberalism? To answer this question, one must start with the assumption
that neoliberalism aims at the expansion of markets only. An "expanded
market" or, say, a "global market" does not mean solely a meeting place
of supply and demand as in the conventional sense. Rather, it is a social
organization.' 99 In such a market, there are two major participants-
196. Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, and Perraton have classified the academic debate on
globalization into three broad schools of thought: the hyperglobalist thesis, the sceptical
thesis, and the transformationalist hesis. Hyperglobalizers are those who believe that
contemporary globalization defines a new era in which peoples everywhere are increasingly
subject to the disciplines of the global market place; sceptics argue that globalization is a
myth which conceals the reality of an international economy increasingly segmented into
three major regional blocks in which national governments remain very powerful; and
tranformationalists view contemporary patterns of globalization as historically unprecedented,
whereby states and societies across the globe are experiencing a process of profound
change as they try to build a more interconnected but highly certain world. It is within
the Hyperglobalist School that the neoliberalism finds its place. In this camp, an orthodox
liberal account of globalization can be found alongside Marxist accounts. The other two
theses-the sceptics and tranformationalists-rather than basing their view on any ideology
identify themselves with the position of a myth and a new architecture of the world order,
respectively. For a detailed discussion, see DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS:
POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE (1999).
197. In this context, globalization is defined as "a politically contested process in
which different state-market models of interaction come into conflict locally, nationally,
and transnationally." Sedn 0 Riain, States and Markets in an Era of Globalization, 26
ANN. REV. Soc. 187, 188 (2000).
198. GEORGE DEMARTINO, GLOBAL ECONOMY, GLOBAL JUSTICE: THEORETICAL
OBJECTIONS AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES TO NEOLIBERALISM 125 (2000).
199. See generally NEIL FLIGSTEIN, THE ARCHITECTURE OF MARKETS: AN ECONOMIC
SOCIOLOGY OF TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CAPITALIST SOCIETIES (2001). The basis of such
markets is the existence of certain institutions. Institutions refer to shared rules, which can be
laws or collective understandings, held in place by custom, explicit agreements, or tacit
agreements. These institutions-which can be called property rights, governance
structures, conceptions of control, and rules of exchange-enable actors in markets to
incumbent and challenger firms-which know one another and take one
another's behavior into account in their actions.200 The stability~l l of this
market depends on the production of a conception of control. Conceptions
of control
refer to understandings that structure perceptions of how a market works and
that allow actors to interpret their world and act to control situations. A
conception of control is simultaneously a worldview that allows actors to
interpret the actions of others and a reflection of how the market is structured.
202
The formation of such a market culture is driven both by exogenous
factors, such as resource dependence, and endogenous factors, such as
with whom one wants to build interdependencies. 203 The stability of the
market will be upset when new entrants break through it with new
conceptions of control.20 4 The existing players on the market look upon
the state to intervene to protect a local market that is threatened. 20 5 However,
any state that has been acting according to a determined strategy
20 6
regarding markets and society finds itself in an alien element and rushes
to learn the lessons of the new environment.20 7
The state has two options with regard to the new entrants: to strengthen
the old conception of control or to accept a new one. If the state opts to
organize themselves, to compete and cooperate, and to exchange. For a detailed account,
see Neil Fligstein, Markets as Politics: A Political-Cultural Approach to Market
Institutions, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 656, 658 (1996).
200. NEIL FLIGSTEIN, MARKETS, POLITICS, AND GLOBALIZATION 36 (1997).
"Incumbents". are the principal players of the market, who determine the rules of the
game. "Challengers" are the outsiders. They must accept the rules of the game or risk a
"war."
201. Stability here refers to a situation where the identities and the status hierarchy
of the incumbent and challenger firms are well known. Fligstein, supra note 199, at 663.
202. Id. at 658.
203. For an empirical study on the structuring of and the criteria for organizational
networks in a globalized society, see Ranjay Gulati & Martin Gargiulo, Where do
Interorganizational Networks Come From?, 104 AM. J. Soc. 1439 (1999).
204. Entry into the market can be made in various ways, e.g., through imports,
acquisition of an old established firm, or a "management shake-up." P.A. GEROSKI,
MARKET DYNAMICS AND ENTRY 10 (1991).
205. FLIGSTEIN, supra note 199, at 73.
206. On the basis of their relationship with markets, 0 Riain has classified states
into four categories: liberal states, social rights states, developmental states, and socialist
states. Liberal states are those where the state promotes the markets in every sphere of
society and ultimately even in the state itself. This is done by securing favorable
conditions for the reproduction of the markets. In social rights states, the state limits the
range of feasible market strategies by strengthening society and setting social limits on
market action. Here there is an alliance between the state and society, which sets limits
on the ways in which markets can be organized. In developmental states, the state never
undertakes any tasks by itself but shapes the capabilities of society and markets to
undertake the tasks. Socialist states endeavor to subsume society and the market within
the state. 0 Riain, supra note 197, at 193-200.
207. A detailed empirical study on the predicament of states in the wake of these
global changes appears in HELD ET AL., supra note 196.
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strengthen the old conception of control, it needs to take steps to block
entry to the local market, either by raising prices (tariffs) above costs or
by increasing the efficiency of operations. Raising prices above the costs
will result in immediate entry to the market by other agents, whereas
increasing efficiency will certainly be a bonus, as efficiency and the
resulting dividends will materialize without all the ruckus of actual
entry. 0 8 But with a horde of potential entrants surrounding the market
neither raising prices nor improved efficiency seems to be easily realizable.
In this predicament, the state is left with only one option, to adopt the
new conception of control. 20 9 This requires changing the local market to
fit the diverse set of global actors that have invaded it with new conceptions
of control and integrating the markets into one whole. There are a
variety of ways to integrate the national markets into the global whole.
As it is increasingly difficult for states to function detached from the
market or isolated from transnational capital, 210 they carry out integration
mainly through free trade and free capital mobility.21 ' This is facilitated by
establishing rules for economic actors in the market in areas like property
rights, governance structures, and rules of exchange.212 For newly expanding
markets, however, creating stable conceptions of control is difficult because
property rights, governance structures, and rules of exchange are
vaguely specified. 213 Moreover, the various inconsistencies in the world
of competitive business such as continuing discrepancies in the comparative
prices, wages, profits, and interest rates of different countries, sectors, trades
and industries, impose practical limitations upon capital mobility.214 Cultural
disparities, divergence in legal systems, and a lack of communication
facilities compound the problem. To heighten the mobility of capital, a
state must also increase the porosity of its international borders.
Achieving these capacities requires states to interact with firms, political
208. GEROSKI, supra note 204, at 10.
209. Here, too, firms follow the same strategies and criteria that they followed in
adapting to earlier conceptions of control. To understand how they do so, see Gulati &
Gargiulo, supra note 203.
210. John Roemer, Market Socialism: A Blueprint, 38 DIssENT 562 (1991).
211. For different perspectives on this aspect, see Jagdish Bhagwati, The Capital
Myth: The Difference between Trade in Widgets and Dollars, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 7 (1999);
Jeff Faux, Without Consent: Global Capital Mobility and Democracy, 51 DISSENT 43
(2004).
212. Fligstein, supra note 199, at 660.
213. Id. at 661.
214. Lawrence Seltzer, The Mobility of Capital, 46 Q.J. ECON. 496 (1932).
parties, international institutions, and newly invented conceptions of
regulation.215
The neoliberal requirements for states include political correction,
cultural adaptation, optimization of resources, spatial allocation of
economic activity (urbanization), decentralization, and harmonization of
laws and legal systems. These are met by allocating tasks to sub-state
enterprises such as international organizations, companies, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and other pertinent actors. The sole task of the
state in this project is the coordination of the various actors involved in
the globalization process, who work together to ensure free mobility of
capital and goods. The state retains its essential role but takes on the
function of a critical enterprise in promoting economic competition and
mobility; its role as a "civil association" diminishes.21 6
Earlier, neoliberalism was mentioned as working to create a global
whole; that is, one unity into which the relevant parts are integrated.
However, this requires a de-integration of national units-ripping them
apart and integrating them into the global whole. This process could be
perceived as a "shift from a two-dimensional Euclidian space with its
centers and peripheries and sharp boundaries, to a multidimensional
global space with unbounded, often discontinuous and interpenetrating
sub-spaces., 217 "The functional integration of this space depends less upon
horizontal relations of spatial integration emphasized by concentric []
zone[s] and more upon hierarchically structured linkages to global
system processes, such as capital accumulation and the [] international
division of labor., 21 8 This character of "integration" that connects any
point to any other point, the structuring of diversities by ramifying into
states, societies, and many other social bodies and spaces are what make
neoliberalism a matrix of all global changes.
The changes that neoliberalism has brought about in the global order
are noticeable in all aspects of human interaction. Neoliberalism has ionized
every facet of social life in its ethical domain, regardless of the facet's
internal values or exterior texture. It has secularized the world but wrought
a newly organized order with liberal values and attitudes. The reason for
this transformation is the fundamental logic of globalization. It is probably
among the simplest of all the ideologies that the world has ever seen but
the one with the most consequential outcome. It has perhaps nothing more
215. Fligstein, supra note 199, at 661.
216. Philip G. Cerny, Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action,
49 INT'L ORG. 595, 597 (1995).
217. M. Kearney, The Local and the Global: The Anthropology of Globalization
and Transnationalism, 24 ANN. REv. ANTHROPOLOGY 547, 549 (1995).
218. Id. at 552 (quoting M. GOTTDIENER, THE SOCIAL PRODUCTION OF URBAN SPACE
76 (1985) (internal quotations omitted)).
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substantial to call its own than the free market ideology had during the
liberal revolution of the nineteenth century, with the exception of the
international exchange of foreign capital. States in the twentieth
century liberal revolution have only one motivation and target: the creation
of conditions that facilitate the accumulation of foreign capital so that
they can compete in an "extended market." In endeavoring to attract
foreign capital, states tamper with their legal systems, ideologies,
monetary exchange rates, environment, and cultural values-everything
which hampers the free flow of capital-in "a neoliberal race to the
bottom., 220 What ensue are ideological de-construction, perestroika, and
the standardization of legal systems. Every branch of knowledge,
descriptive as well as abstract, has rewritten its assumptions, concepts,
values, and practices so that the neoliberal agenda can effectively be
implanted in their respective fields.
Among all the changes, the most perceptible change was the appearance
and exponential increase of new actors in the global amphitheater-
multinational corporations, NGOs, and other agents of change-a forum
built on the principles of universalism, individualism, rational voluntaristic
authority, progress, and world citizenship.221 These institutions are imbued
with neoliberal culture, concerns, content, norms, and shape. Although
they cannot claim to have totally taken over the baton from the states,
they lobby and criticize states, mobilize around and elaborate global
cultural principles, and convince states to act on those principles.222
Amid this proliferation of neoliberal institutions, the existing non-neoliberal
institutions began to face functional crises resulting in institutional gaps
219. Deepak Nayyar, Towards Global Governance, in GOVERNING GLOBALIZATION
3, 8 (Deepak Nayyar ed., 2002).
220. How this tampering has resulted in a nascent global state is well articulated in
Chimni, supra note 35, at 7-10.
221. John Boli & George M. Thomas, World Culture in the World Polity: A Century of
International Non-Governmental Organization, 62 AM. Soc. REv. 171, 187 (1997).
222. Id. For a discussion of multinational corporations in the contemporary
international political economy in various perspectives, see Richard E. Caves, The
Multinational Enterprise as an Economic Organization, Walter B. Wriston, Agents of
Change are Rarely Welcome, Stephen D. Krasner, Multinational Corporations, Sayre P.
Schatz, Assertive Pragmatism and the Multinational Enterprise, and Richard S.
Newfarmer, Multinationals and Marketplace Magic the 1980 's, in JEFFRY A. FRIEDEN &
DAVID LAKE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL POWER
AND WEALTH 146-207 (2d ed. 1991). For a review of the literature on the role of
nongovernmental organizations in international politics, see William F. Fisher, Doing
Good? The Politics and Antipolitics of NGO Practices, 26 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY
439 (1997).
and were reconstituted with a rich dose of the neoliberal mandate.223
They now function with a dual agenda: 1) to guarantee that the neoliberal
mandate is effectively enforced by laying down uniform standards to
enforce economic sanctions, to attach conditionalities, and to ensure that
member states do not pursue excessive protectionism and hence a "race
to the bottom;" and 2) to shape the future neoliberal manifesto by creating
linkages across issues and to serve as agents who create as well as
diffuse ideas, norms, and expectations. 4
The "trickle down economics" of neoliberalism is a maturing process,
with more fields of applications, more facets of culture, more growth
expectation and probably more neoliberalism, 22 5 which builds a progression
in itself. Progression may be described as a series of occurrences
involving the same or varied intensity for each occurrence, appearing
every time in new and different spheres ad infinitum. It is akin to a
progression as a mathematical abstraction with a series of numbers and
the same relation between each number, although the terms vary. The
operation of neoliberalism may be demonstrated through the following
arithmetic progression of squares.
1 <> 4 <> 9 <> 16 <> 25 <> 36 <> 49 <> 64 <> 89 ......
Every space between the numbers (<>) is an occurrence. The basic
unit of the intensity of these occurrences is x, which remains the same or
varies throughout the progression and depends on the intensity of the
occurrence; it could be xl, x7, x8, etc. The numbers or the squares are
the various spheres of activities, which vary in value, quality, quantity,
properties, and performance. Yet, the basic operation of the progression
is squaring. In the context of the world order, neoliberalism stands as
the basic operation. It produces a set of waves that occur with either the
same or different intensity engulfing one sphere after another that once
stood independent, with its own values and identities. This recurs then
223. This reconstitution, says Chimni in the context of United Nations, "is a cumulative
result of (a) assigning a greater role to the corporate actors within the UN; (b) redefining
the principle of non-use of force by the Western power-bloc against the third world states
and; (c) adopting the neo-liberal state as a model for its member states, manifested in
particular in its peace-building efforts in post-conflict societies." See Chimni, supra note
35, at 14. For support, see U.N. Secretary General, Larger Freedom: Towards Development,
Security and Human Rights for All, A/59/2005, available at http://www.centerforunreform.
org/node/206. See also Richard Falk, The United Nations System: Prospects for Renewal,
Jong-II You, The Bretton Woods Institutions: Evolution, Reform and Change, and S.P.
Shukla, From GATT to the WTO and Beyond, in GOVERNING GLOBALIZATION (Deepak
Nayyar ed., 2002).
224. Devesh Kapur, Processes of Change in International Organizations, in GOVERNING
GLOBALIZATION 335 (Deepak Nayyar ed., 2002).
225. Cf FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992).
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with the same or different intensity and consistency in other spheres.
Even though the progression grows, its basic neoliberal character remains
invariable.
B. The WTO and Neoliberalism: Juxtapositions
The conceptualization of neoliberalism shows that the concept primarily
necessitates a horizontal allocation of power and functions among various
global actors and that international organizations (1O) constitute significant
actors. The neoliberal functions of 1Os in general include sustaining long-
term cooperation among self-interested states, harmonizing global standards,
perpetuating decentralization, and promoting global networking for
cross-national interaction. 226 They carry out these functions in ways
compatible with [neo]liberalism and the global order.227 A simple analysis
in neoliberal terms reveals that 1Os function under a principal-agent
relationship in which 1Os derive authority from the state. A complex
neoliberal approach says that the authority of 1Os derive from social
relations.228 However, both views of IOs have their own reasoning and
stand in a symbiotic relation. 229 The wisdom of both views is required to
illustrate the correlation between the WTO and neoliberalism.
In the section to follow, the role and authority of 1Os in the neoliberal
state of affairs will be described in general. Drawing on that understanding,
the WTO will be examined in the same terms. The process reveals that
neoliberalism is the source of the WTO's normative power.
226. For an analysis of horizontal power allocations in the context of sovereignty,
see John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept, 97
AM. J. INT'L L. 782 (2003).
227. Michael Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Power of Liberal International
Organizations, in POWER IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 161, 162 (Michael Barnett &
Raymond Duvall eds., 2005).
228. Id. For a more detailed treatment on the complex neoliberal approach, see
Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of
International Organizations, 53 INT'L ORG. 699, 707-15 (1999).
229. A seminal approach to the concept of 1Os is that taken by Jan Klabbers. He
conceptualizes 1Os firstly as endowed with a managerial task, whereby they perform
specialized tasks delegated by states and secondly in terms of an agora where 1Os are
public realms in which international issues can be discussed. He then threads the two
concepts together despite their inherent and functional drawbacks. See Jan Klabbers,
Two Concepts ofInternational Organization, 2 INT'L ORG. L. REv. 277 (2005).
1. International Organizations in the New World Order
a. International Organizations Situated
At the core of the general idea of 1Os lies a synthesis of aspirations for
an orderly world community and the positive creative influence such
aspirations might derive from the policy and action of states."' In this
scheme, states view 1Os as instruments through which they might further
the cause of an orderly world while retaining their national policies and
interests, what Pitman B. Potter called "a very complex and delicate
computation of costs and benefits., 23 1 The simple impression is that
international cooperation can be carried out more effectively through
IOs, because 1Os can accommodate differences of policy where everyone
shows a high tolerance for disagreements. Inter-nation collaboration is
the subatomic property of 1Os. 2 32 However, neoliberalism requires IOs
to be much more functional and demands their increased participation as
sub-state actors in helping the state fulfill its neoliberal roles. 33
Theoretically, within neoliberalism, the sub-atomic property of inter-
nation collaboration remains unharmed, as without mutuality transnational
networks for the free mobility of capital and goods cannot be built. This
shifts the pendulum towards the simple neoliberal (to some extent
realist) view that the power of 1Os is a cumulative product of state
power. This is certainly a true assertion, although not a complete one.
Barnett and Finnemore endorsed it, albeit under a different concern:
"Certainly there are occasions when [] states do drive 10 behavior, but
there are also times when other forces are at work that eclipse or
significantly dampen the effect of states on IOs. '
234
230. Charles E. Rothwell, International Organization and World Politics, 3 INT'L
ORG. 605, 607 (1949).
231. Pitman B. Potter, The Logic of International Relations and Organization, 44
AM. POL. Sci. REv. 661, 664 (1950).
232. This "sub-atomic" property has been present throughout the various conceptualizations
of lOs-functionalist integration theory, neo-functionalist regional integration theory,
and interdependence theory. On functionalism, see DAVID MITRANY, A WORKING PEACE
SYSTEM (1966); on neo-functionalism, see ERNST B. HASS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE:
POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FORCES, 1950-1957 (1958); on interdependence theory, see
ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD POLITICS
IN TRANSITION (1977). All three theories assert that international institutions can help
states cooperate.
233. See supra, Part IV.A.
234. Barnett & Finnemore, supra note 228, at 714-15. This assertion is preceded by
a suspicion that an 1O's power is derived from state power. The skepticism is substantiated
with the cases of the World Bank, NATO, The European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, and the OSCE, which perform the job of "norm diffusion" for powerful
states. The authors are concerned that the realist [and neoliberal] theories that sustain
these practices provide no "ontological independence" for 1Os.
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They then continued with a progressive plan: "Which causal mechanisms
produce which effects under which conditions is a set of relationships
that can be understood only by intensive empirical study of how these
organizations actually do their business. 235
The complex neoliberal approach, which maintains that the authority
of 1Os is generated from certain social relations, helps in understanding
this relationship. This approach is called complex because it cannot be shown
with a definitional ease, but rather requires a step-by-step presentation.
By positioning 1Os in the neoliberal scheme and by providing a concise
clarification, the authority of 1Os to a great extent can be attributed to
their social position.
While conceptualizing neoliberalism, it was established that neoliberalism
requires accumulation of capital by states and, accordingly, the removal
of all barriers to the free mobility of capital and goods. In order to
accomplish these objectives, states need interactions with various global
actors. These interactions in their entirety typify "social relations." In
other words, social relations mean the sum of exchanges through which
global actors manage their commonized affairs across the world.236 The
management of common affairs-fashionably known as "global
governance"-is not an easy task, given the diversity of national self
interests. In addition, a lack of authoritative governmental institutions at the
international level creates pervasive uncertainty. This structural anarchy
results in the formation of regimes, which are "sets of implicit or explicit
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which
actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations."237
235. Id.
236. Cf CLIVE ARCHER, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 109 (2001). Generally it
is presumed that in the intensifying interactions between various global actors, states are
likely to adopt protective barriers and re-create the conditions for enduring conflict,
which prompt a need for governance and rule-making at the global level. For a treatment
on the various facets of global governance, see Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall,
Power in Global Governance, in POWER IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Michael Barnett &
Raymond Duvall eds., 2005).
237. This definition of "regime" provided by Stephen D. Krasner is the most widely
accepted. Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes
as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed.,
1983), originally published in Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime
Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, 36 INT'L ORG. 185 (1982). For more
on the regime literature, see for example ORAN YOUNG, GOVERNANCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS
189-93 (1999); Stephan Haggard & Beth Simmons, Theories of International Regimes,
41 INT'L ORG. 491 (1987). For a review of studies on and approaches to regimes, see
ANDRAES HASENCLEVER ET AL., THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (1997). For a
Regimes are managed by classifying them on the basis of various "issues,"
e.g., international crime, security and conflict, environmental degradation,
and migration. Regimes are "tool-kits" for the management of common
affairs; norms, rules, and decision-making procedures are the tools. 238
The formation of a regime is inter alia a process of institutionalization,
239
and 1Os are concrete institutions with formal structures and sets of rules.
lOs can serve the needs of a regime in implementing and administering
the provisions of the governance systems.240 They help to create substantive
agreements "by providing a framework of rules, norms, principles, and
procedures for negotiation."
241
Before going into detail, a caveat regarding the approach is in order.
In the explanation to follow, the formation of regimes is viewed as a
social action, the result of a particular social situation.2 42 It follows that
the formation of a regime is not a part of a state's general "governance"
scheme, which is a strategy of sorts. Governance of common interests
begins only with the institutionalization of issues. Regimes, however,
provide a framework for this; regimes are maintained by human actions.
To describe effectively the position of 1Os, an explanation is necessary
starting with governance or, more specifically, one step back, with the
formation of regimes. What necessitates the formation of regimes? In
outlining the argument, the situation preceding the formation of new
regimes is characterized as anarchical and uncertain. Despite the variations
in formulations among the three streams of thought on regimes-the
detailed treatment on how regimes are formed and what the creation of international
regimes requires, see Robert Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, 36 INT'L
ORG. 325 (1982). For a case study, see THOMAS GEHRING, DYNAMIC INTERNATIONAL
REGIMES: INSTITUTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES (1994).
238. ARCHER, supra note 236, at 109.
239. James Bohman, International Regimes and Democratic Governance: Political
Equality and Influence in Global Institutions, 75 INT'L AFF. 499, 500 (1999). When
regime formation is discussed as a process of institutionalization, "international organization"
as a concept is strictly differentiated from "international institution." International relations
are considered orderly and institutions are one form of that orderliness. "Institutions"
can be defined more systematically as "the collective forms of basic structures of social
organization as established by law or human tradition." An "international organization"
in this context represents a form of institution that comprises "a formal system of rules
and objectives and a rationalized administrative instrument, which has a formal technical
and material organization: constitutions, local chapters, physical equipment, machines,
emblems, letterhead stationery, a staff, an administrative hierarchy and so forth."
See M. DUVERGER, THE STUDY OF POLITICS 68 (1972); P. SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN
ADMINISTRATION 8 (1957). Both definitions are as quoted in ARCHER, supra note 236, at
2.
240. ORAN YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT
IN A STATELESS SOCIETY 164 (1994).
241. Keohane, supra note 237, at 337.
242. See Oran Young, Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of Regimes, 36 INT'L
ORG. 277, 279 (1982). As a footnote to this view, Young emphasizes its similarity to the
philosophical tenets of legal positivism.
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realists, 243 the neoliberals, 244 and the cognitivists,245 -there is some level
of unanimity as to the prevalence of anarchy and uncertainty before the
formation of a regime.246 Anarchy is generally defined as a system where
both central authority and collective security are absent-a system of
self-help and power politics.
247
The paper will assert that anarchy is a social construction, akin to the
Benthamite social situation. In other words, anarchy is not a moribund
concept; it is, as Alexander Wendt premised, "what states make of it."
248
States do not resort to self-help and power politics in all circumstances
243. The realist view on regimes is a power-oriented one. It works on the basis of a
presumption that "states care not only for relative, but for absolute gain as well."
HASENCLEVER ET AL., supra note 237, at 3. Hence realists are skeptical about the effectiveness
of institutions; they nevertheless realize the significance of regimes. Realists believe that
the presence of a hegemon that has the resources and power to support the regime can
ensure its continuity. See id. at 83-135 (providing general account of the realist position
on regimes). See Charles P. Kindleberger, Dominance and Leadership in the International
Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides, 25 INT'L STUD. Q. 242 (1981)
(providing general account of hegemonic stability). For a general account of the realist
position on regimes, see HASENCLEVER ET AL., supra note 237, at 83-135. On hegemonic
stability see Kindleberger, supra.
244. Neoliberalist theories on regimes are interest-oriented ones. They posit that
states are atomistic actors that seek to maximize their absolute gains and are indifferent
to relative gains. "Cheating... is the greatest impediment to cooperation among rationally
egotistic [nations]." Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist
Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, 42 INT'L ORG. 485, 487 (1988) (providing an
understanding of neoliberalist view on institutionalism in relation to realism). However,
neoliberalists believe that regimes can help states overcome this barrier to joint action by
facilitating cooperation, providing information, lowering transaction costs, promoting
linkages, and so on. For details, see HASENCLEVER ET AL, supra note 237, at 23-82.
245. The Cognitivist concept of regimes is knowledge based. There are two approaches
to cognitivism-weak cognitivism and strong cognitivism. Weak cognitivists believe
that ideas help to reduce uncertainty in international affairs. "[C]onsensual knowledge
and epistemic communities facilitate policy innovation, diffusion, selection, and persistence."
Eric Brahm, International Regimes, Beyond Intractability (2005), http://www.beyond
intractability.org/essay/intemational regimes/?nid=6584. The advantage of this view is that
regimes are seen as the result of dynamic ideas. Strong cognitivists consider the international
system as a social structure. They emphasize the sense of obligation that exists and
reasons for the varied pull of compliance. Thus regimes can act as a "source of self-
understandings of the world." Id. For a detailed account, see HASENCLEVER ET AL, supra
note 237, at 136-210.
246. This version, however, is a refinement of a more crude formulation whereby
anarchy is a perpetual phenomenon that is generally overcome by cooperation among
states; anarchy then remains suppressed or hidden. For a discussion, see Kenneth A.
Oye, Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypothesis and Strategies, 38 WORLD
POL. 1 (1985).
247. Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction
of Power Politics, 46 INT'L ORG. 391, 392 (1992).
248. Id. at 395 (emphasis omitted).
but are driven to do so by endogenous factors. They act on the basis of
the meanings that the objects constitute for them.24 9 Such meanings are
defined in accordance with the social situation; to quote Wendt, "[a]ctors
do not have a 'portfolio' of interests that they carry around independent
of social context., 250 Accordingly, anarchy exists because the social
conditions, which include interests and interest-based interactions,
necessitate it.
According to neoliberals, anarchy could be conquered by institutionalized
patterns of cooperation.25' Such a situation can be provided by regimes,
which are principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around
which actors' expectations converge. Through regimes, actors seek to
reduce conflicts of interest and risk by coordinating their behavior.
252
However, the emergence of regimes is not a deliberate action; they
are natural formations. Krasner conceptualized regime formation as
"[the] intervening... [action] between basic causal factors... and
outcomes and behavior., 253 Although this action might be the result of
egoistic self-interest on the part of some states or a concentration of
power in a single actor or group of actors-both of which impede the
rest of the actors and jeopardize common interests-the end result is a
convergence of the expectations of many individual actors.
Such a convergence could occur for two reasons: 1) a desire to regain
an equilibrium of common interests and 2) a fear that if the tables are254
turned, there is a likelihood of reciprocation. The core of this contention
is that regime formation is a societal response to anarchy and uncertainty,
that is, a social force.255 These forces lead to conventionalized behavior,
which generates a certain set of values. The values then form the basis
of international normativity 6 Accordingly, a regime is a normative
structure upon which states can construct shared understandings. The
norms, however, are validated by the social conventions that create them.
Yet, mere convergence of expectations around a set of valid norms is
pointless. Given the decentralized nature of international relations, such
a normative system remains ineffective; it requires institutional forms
and organizational structures with decision-making power and procedures.
249. Id. at 396-97.
250. Id. at 398.
251. See, e.g., Keohane, supra note 237, at 325.
252. See generally Krasner, supra note 237.
253. Id. at 1.
254. This is a reversed version of the argument put forward in Robert Jervis,
Security Regimes, 36 INT'L ORG. 357 (1982).
255. See generally Young, supra note 242.
256. See Jaye Ellis, International Regimes and the Legitimacy of Rules: A
Discourse-Ethical Approach, 27 ALTERNATIvES: GLOBAL. LOC., POL. 273, 274-77 (2002).
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b. Why do International Organizations Matter?
Under a neoliberal governance scheme, a system of shared values, norms,
and enforcement mechanisms diffuses a common culture throughout the
globe. The scheme, however, is manifested through 1Os with programmed
strategies related to voting, membership, and dispute settlement as well as
administrative bodies such as secretariats. However, such structural features
are common to all 1Os that have existed to date. Why are modern IOs
special? Why do they matter in the new world order? What makes them
the centerpiece of contemporary scholarly discourse?
We now understand that 1Os in a neoliberal scheme are in a pivotal
position and perform multifarious tasks, but an increase in their number
or activities does not evince authority. The authority of modern 1Os is
undisputed, although little is known about its source. Regime theorists
generally rely on the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) to account for it. They
normally argue that the "system" (which includes regimes as well as
1Os) increases the incentive to cooperate by "lengthening the shadow of
the future, limiting the number of players, increasing the transparency of
state action, and altering the payoff structure., 25 7 However, this view can
be subjected to the criticism that states that are in iterative cooperation
are not like prisoners, who stay separated from each other. This criticism
will have little vigor, as will be pointed out below. Moreover, the PD
only offers an explanation as to how the cooperation works; it implies
that regimes have some kind of inherent quality that makes cooperation
inevitable but fails to explain what that inevitability is. Otherwise, the
PD can be an effective theory to explain the authority of 1Os. The lacuna,
however, can be filled in by drawing from the sociological discourse on
globalization.
A good starting point for this discussion is the nation-state because the
dominance of nation-states is parallel to the development of international
relations.258 In the world system, nation-states guarded their territories,
nurtured their cultures, and secured recognition of their autonomy from
other states through international relations, what Anthony Giddens calls
"reflexively ordered relations." 260 The system overall was a "simple model[ ]
257. See Haggard & Simmons, supra note, 237 at 513 (providing basis for this summary
of the regime theorists' view on the authority of regimes as a whole).
258. MALCOLM WATERS, GLOBALIZATION 47 (1995); drawing heavily on ROBERTSON,
supra note 195; GIDDENS, infra note 257.
259. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, TE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 73 (1990).
260. Id.
of world polity."'26' At the same time, nation-states were citadels of national
interests and in a state of anarchy were sanctuaries of security and peace.
The world in that state of affairs was a collection of states dwelling in
anarchy. The nation-state system with its centralized governmental control
over the citizens posed the biggest impediment to achieving the neoliberal
goals. The neoliberal action plan targeted the system accordingly and
attempted to remove all the "national barricades" that it had erected. This
process involved lifting all kinds of social relations out of their
national/local context and restructuring them at the global level.262 This
decontextualization posed a formidable threat to the fundamental design
of nation-states, 263 but the argument does not mean that the nation-state
is dead; rather, it has gained resilience and now performs actions once
managed unilaterally in cooperation with other global actors and in an
enhanced network of relationships. These relationships between the local
and the global are facilitated by the annihilation of space by time, Giddens'
"time-space distanciation process, '264 as a result of which social relationships
materialize across great expanses of time and space. States now deal
with each other through non-state actors, who may even remain invisible
to each other, much like the prisoners in the PD. The developing progression
of neoliberalism requires states, as well as other actors, to keep themselves
informed about the multiplying nature of activities and "system developments,"
including changes in the character and rules of the market. To this end,
the participants build fiduciary relationships while remaining cautious
about risks. To maintain these relationships, a knowledge of the risks
involved as well as other actors' strategy is necessary, and this is where
1Os play a significant role.
In this scheme, 1Os, as framed by Jan Klabbers, serve as an agora 6 -
a sort of epistemic forum, although Klabbers called the idea "less
progressive, less optimistic, [and] less modernist., 266 Klabbers' position
261. ROBERTSON, supra note 195, at 61 (internal quotations omitted).
262. WATERS, supra note 258, at 49 (drawing on GIDDENS, supra note 259).
263. See TONY SCHIRATO & JENN WEB, UNDERSTANDING GLOBALIZATION 104
(2003) (summarizing the effect of globalization on nation-states). However, scholars
such as Giddens and Robertson believe that the fundamental logic of globalization lies in
the very concept of the nation-state. Waters deduces this logic in the following words:
"nation-states are bounded social systems; they will compete for resources and markets
and they will not necessarily be materially self-sufficient; they will therefore engage in
economic, military, political (diplomatic) and cultural exchanges across the boundaries
that are both co-operative and conflictual; differential outcomes and therefore cross-
national mimesis will ensue; states will seek to systematize international relations in
order to secure the conditions of their own existence." (parenthesis as in the original).
WATERS, supra note 258, at 45.
264. GIDDENS, supra note 259, at 17-21.
265. Klabbers, supra note 229, at 282.
266. Id. at 283.
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was akin to the cognitivist view on regimes that regimes, including 1Os,
have constitutive effects on actors' identities by providing knowledge
about the ideas that are gaining importance in a given social order. 267 In
this perspective, 1Os provide "system awareness," offer expertise on
specific issues, help states to build a reputation, and so on. Nevertheless,
in a broader scheme, 1Os are not mere epistemic communities; to borrow
from Klabbers again, they operate on a "management-oriented concept"
that facilitates increased cooperation. Keohane has an analogous logic
to offer whereby nation-states in anarchy use international regimes
including 1Os to accomplish those objectives which may not be possible
268through unilateral action. In this view, 1Os provide outlets for settling
disputes and universalizing norms and cultural values by building rules,
monitoring compliance with those rules, and so forth. Cumulatively, lOs
are focal points where actors' expectations converge-the material
manifestations of regimes. Defection, mistrust, and other egotistic actions
of states remove any scope for convergence and threaten common interests.
The structural features of modern 1Os, tailored to meet neoliberal
requirements, facilitate convergence: the agora produces rules laying
down norms; the epistemic community disseminates the situational
requirements of rules as well as information regarding the dividends for
compliance and the consequences of deviation; and the dispute settlement
system facilitates and monitors compliance. Noncompliance is least
preferred (though not unknown), for 1Os will divulge the deviation,
which then affects the reputation of the one who deviates from the rule.
In addition, 1Os provide amenities for retaliation against the transgressor. In
sum, any cooperative venture outside the 1Os is impossible, for every
actor who stays outside the 10 framework remains ignorant of the rules
of the game and ends up a loser.
C. WTO: The Neoliberal Manifesto
In this section, it is first shown that the WTO meets the criteria for a
neoliberal 10 as characterized above. This is done in two stages: 1) by
unknotting the old tale of "GATT to WTO" in a regime-theoretical
perspective to show that the current multilateral trade regime emerged
from an anarchical situation, which created the GATT, and that the
267. See generally HASENCLEVER ET AL., supra note 237.
268. See ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 62 (1984).
regime subsequently underwent a "change" and necessitated an institution
like the WTO with a large dose of neoliberalism; and 2) by demonstrating
that the WTO's institutional apparatuses and strategies are designed in
such a way as to enable it to fulfill the role meant for an 10 in the
neoliberal agenda.
1. Anarchy and the Trade Regime: From GATT to the WTO
In the aftermath of World War I, the United States set a _pro-tariff
policy in motion by enacting the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act.26 One of
the immediate reasons for this policy, according to President Herbert
Hoover, was to counter the substantial hike in the tariff duties on
agricultural products in the world market.27° Immediate retaliation against
this policy came from Canada-the major trading partner of the United
States-in the form of measures such as increasing the preferences given
to British products, levying countervailing duties on certain products and
making minor adjustments and reductions in the general tariff rates.271
In this crisis, countries like Britain and France sought other pastures,
whereas Germany resorted to autarchy. Soon all nations raised their
tariffs and hid behind the walls of protectionism. In this "tariff war," the
self-help trade measures adopted by the states led to a precipitous
decline in international trade and according to some economic historians,
contributed to the economic depression of the 1930s. 272 Quantitative
analyses show that in the wake of the Smoot-Hawley Act "the volume of
US imports plummeted 41.2% between the second quarter of 1930 and
its local trough in the third quarter of 1932, ' 273 whereas world trade in
general declined 14%.274 The impact of Smoot-Hawley-falling prices,
unemployment, and bank failures-demonstrated that excessive protectionism
is harmful. Many economic historians defensively argue that the United
States tariff policy in the wake of the Great Depression was a response
to changes in the economic conditions and undercurrents of national
269. Mario J. Crucini, Sources of Variation in Real Tariff Rates: The United States
1900-1940, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 732, 732 (1994). See also Colleen M. Callahan, Judith
P. McDonald, & Anthony P. O'Brian, Who Voted for Smoot-Hawley?, 54 J. ECON. HIST.
683, 683 (1994).
270. Judith A. McDonald, Anthony P. O'Brien, & Colleen M. Callahan, Trade
Wars: Canada's Reaction to the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, 57 J. EcoN. HIST. 802, 806 (1997).
271. See id at 809.
272. See, e.g., id. at 802.
273. Douglas A. Irwin, The Smoot-Hawley Tariff- A Quantitative Assessment, 80
REv. ECON. & STAT. 326 (1998). However, in this review, the author shows that of the
40% decline in imports, only 8-10% can be directly attributed to the rise in tariffs.
274. Jakob B. Madsen, Trade Barriers and the Collapse of World Trade During the
Great Depression, 67 S. ECON. J. 848, 848 (2001).
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politics and an eventual choice.275 Other countries, in order to secure
their economies, were left with no choice but to resort to the firewall of
protectionism. No matter what the rationale and policy behind the tariff
hikes and the subsequent retaliatory actions were, the economic scenario
represented anarchy in trade and political relations.
Following these developments, states, particularly the United States,
desperately wanted to overcome the problem of excessive protectionism
in which all were left worse off.276 However, the pitfalls of an instantaneous
unilateral tariff reduction were clearly apparent. Considering the exigencies
of the situation, the United States began to campaign for bilateral agreements
with trading partners as the most feasible method at hand. In 1933,
Cordell Hull, then secretary of state drafted a bill authorizing the president
to negotiate such agreements.2 7 The bill became the Reciprocal Trade
Agreements Acts (RTAA), which was a turning point towards liberalization
of the world economy.278
The policy of trade liberalization under bilateral agreements was a
great success. 279 At the same time, reciprocal tariff liberalization had a
political side-effect: if tariffs were reduced instantly, "the export sector
support for a reduction in foreign tariffs would serve as a political
counterweight against complaints from the domestic import-competing
275. See, e.g., David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, The Partisan Paradox and the
U.S. Tariff.- 1877-1934, 50 INT'L ORG. 301,319 (1996).
276. See generally Percy W. Bidwell, Tariff Reform: The Case for Bargaining, 23
AM. ECON. REv. 137 (1933) (capturing the policy mood at the time). See also CHARLES
KINDLEBERGER, THE WORLD IN DEPRESSION: 1929-1939 (HISTORY OF THE WORLD
ECONOMY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY) 291-308 (1973).
277. Michael J. Hiscox, The Magic Bullet? RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade
Liberalization, 53 INT'L ORG. 668, 671 (1999) (obtaining information from CORDELL
HULL, MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HULL 365 (1948)).
278. General economic history literature gives two reasons, wittily called the
"magic bullets" by Hiscox, for the RTAA and the trade liberalization in the mid-1930s.
One was that the practice of logrolling prevalent among the members of Congress was
alarming for any trade liberalizing measure and hence tariff setting was delegated to the
executive branch to ensure more effective policies. The other was the Democratic Party's
pro-liberalization policy, whereby it based the measures on reciprocal concessions that
would strengthen the support from the export interests. However, Hiscox rejects
complete reliance on these two reasons and argues that the trade liberalization policy and
RTAA were to a large extent influenced by the societal preferences and the policy
positions taken by the parties. For a more detailed account see Hiscox, supra note 277,
at 673.
279. Between 1934 and 1939 twenty trade agreements were signed under the RTAA
covering some 30% of U.S. exports and 45% of imports. See L. Alan Winters, The Road
to Uruguay, 100 ECON. J. 1288, 1290 (1990).
sectors., 280 However, the principle of non-discrimination-which served to
speed the liberalization program-was seen as the remedy. In effect,
through a policy of non-discrimination, "bilateral reciprocal tariff reductions
could be multilateralized.
' 281
There was a general skepticism regarding multilateralism, particularly
its Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment, for "no country would be
inclined to make concessions to reduce a particular US tariff if there
[were] a danger that in the US's next negotiation another country would
be allowed access at a lower rate., 282 Hence, states considered it necessary
to carry out a series of bilateral deals at the same time. The combination
of bilateral reciprocity and MFN was not easy to cope with but states
were nevertheless optimistic about the prospects of a multilateral trading
28system. 83 Their optimism mainly centered on a set of principles such as
non-discrimination and reciprocity, which could ensure them a fair deal
in trade relations. A sort of "indivisibility," characterized by John Gerard
Ruggie as a "social construction, 2 84 had taken shape out of the common
interests and expectations of states. Soon the states resolved to formalize
their interests and expectations regarding these principles and international
efforts came into play. The goal was an International Trade Organization
(ITO) that would specify the rules under which multilateral negotiations
would go on, as well as the way in which the rules would be enforced.285
In due course, an interim agreement was reached-GATT.286 The ambitious
scheme of the ITO failed because of a refusal by the U.S. Congress to
ratify the ITO Charter, and the interim GATT, drawn up on the principles
envisioned for the ITO, was converted into a normative institution enabling
members to pursue multilateral trade negotiations.287
GATT marked the genesis of a multilateral trade regime. However, it
was a regime concerned with only one area of trade-tariffs. Several
trade issues, such as prices and earnings derived from the export of
primary commodities, the effect of private business practices on trade,
and non-tariff barriers (although their impact was minor), remained
280. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, GATT-Think 29 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 8005, 2000).
281. Id.
282. Winters, supra note 279, at 1290.
283. See id. at 1290-91.
284. John Gerard Ruggie, Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution, 46 INT'L
ORG. 561, 571 (1992).
285. For details, see HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 1, at 12-15.
286. Kofi Annan, Laying the Foundations of a Fair and Free World Trade System,
in THE ROLE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 19, 20
(Gary P. Sampson, ed., 2001).
287. Id.
288. Jock A. Finlayson & Mark W. Zacher, The GATT and the Regulations of Trade
Barriers: Regime Dynamics and Functions, 35 INT'L ORG. 561,562 (1981).
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outside the scope of GATT. Yet, states' expectations converged in GATT,
which successfully regulated trade barriers through its own set of rules
and decision-making procedures.
The principle of economic nationalism that permeated the era posed
governance dilemmas for the new regime. The situation highlighted the
need for a hegemon that would be able to maintain open markets for
surplus goods and sustain the flow of capital while managing the institutions
and instilling values and norms into the regime. The United States,
which had control over raw materials and capital and a competitive
advantage in value-added goods, took on this function. 289 However, its
tenure was short-lived; the power-oriented United States hegemony
could not successfully maintain the robustness of the regime. According
to John Ikenberry, the principal reason for the failure of the United
States hegemony in the multilateral trade regime was the economic and
political disequilibrium created by the war.290 In effect, the objectives of
hegemony could not be balanced with the power at the disposal of the
United States.29' The collapse of the unipolar global structure and the
emergence of bipolarism as a part of the Cold War loosened the United
States' grip over power structures. In addition, the emergence of regional
arrangements with legalized preferential trading arrangements attenuated
norms like nondiscrimination. In the wake of these changes, the norms
and rules of GATT underwent substantial erosion, moving the regime
towards being a cluster of sterile norms and rules. 292 Yet, it was not
until 1970s that the trade regime came under severe pressure.293 In the
wake of the economic recession, protectionist measures became widespread,
mostly in the form of non-tariff barriers.294 GATT made an attempt to
289. See generally G. John Ikenberry, Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony,
104 POL. Sci. Q. 375 (1989).
290. Id. at 385.
291. Id.
292. Finlayson and Zacher have identified seven broad categories of norms of the
multilateral trade regime under GATT: nondiscrimination, liberalization, reciprocity, the
right to take safeguard action, economic development, norms relating to multilateralism,
and the role of states with major interests in trade relations. They analyze in detail why
these norms failed to be effective under the multilateral trade regime. See Finlayson &
Zacher, supra note 288, at 566-98.
293. Howse, supra note 51, at 101.
294. Drawing on Bhagwati, Howse lists the factors that led to the economic
recession in the 1970s. These included the collapse of the gold standard, mounting
intellectual and practical challenges to the postwar economic model, which in turn led to
various macro-economic interventions for adjustment purposes, as well as new practices such
as voluntary export restraints. See id. See also JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM (1988).
address the challenges of the new protectionism through the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations (MTN) in what was an economically unstable and
politically disturbed world,295 but its institutional inadequacies became
apparent in short order, e.g., the obsoleteness of rules and outmoded
negotiating strategies.296 At the normative level, GATT was strangled between
its conventional economic nationalism and the call for interdependency that
permeated the mid-1970s.297 These concerns became the core of the Uruguay
Round negotiations.
The Uruguay Round proceeded with an ambitious agenda of dealing
with non-tariff barriers to trade and other liberalization policies.298 In
the negotiations, many of the GATT rules were retained, and some new
ones were instituted in order to address new substantive areas, e.g., intellectual
property, investments and services. One significant trend noted in the
Round was the use of mutual adjustments in connection with protectionist
non-tariff barriers that were constrained by domestic political and economic
pressures. 299 Compromises were also reached in the liberalization of
agriculture and textiles. The results nevertheless indicated the continuation
of multilateral trading arrangements.
The core architectural principles of GATT, e.g., Most Favoured Nation
Treatment (MFN) and reciprocity, were transposed into the WTO, although
subject to minor alterations, mostly at the operational level. For example,
the scope of derogation from MFN in the form of exemptions was
broadened in the Uruguay Round.300 Reciprocity also took on new forms
to deal with non-tariff measures.3°' In the area of dispute settlement, apart
from remarkable structural changes, the system of power- and diplomacy-
295. According to Jackson, the political world was watching the U.S. military
activity in Vietnam, which had economic repercussions such as hike in oil prices, high
unemployment and rampant inflation. Most of the political systems were operating on
narrow parliamentary majorities and had to respond to the complaints about the harm
caused by imports. JACKSON, supra note 1 at 36. See also id. at 34-38 (describing how
GATT conducted the MTN in the midst of these issues).
296. Id. at 39-42.
297. See Robert Keohane, International Organization and the Crisis of Interdependence,
29 INT'L ORG. 357 (1975) (sketching interdependence).
298. For details, see Winters, supra note 279, at 1296-1303. See also Bernard
Hoekman, New Issues in the Uruguay Round and Beyond, 103 EcON. J. 1528 (1993).
299. KEOHANE, supra note 268, at 194.
300. Although GATT demanded unconditional MFN, it provided exceptions relating to
balance of payment difficulties, the establishment of customs unions and free trade areas,
dumping, and the accession of new members. Under the WTO, exceptions relate to balance
of payment difficulties, newly acceded members, general and security exceptions, anti-
dumping, customs unions and free trade areas, the settlement of disputes, nullification and
impairment, and the establishment of infant industries. For details, see RORDEN WILKINSON,
MULTILATERALISM AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE ARCHITECTURE AND
EXTENSION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION 80-99 (2000).
301. See HOEKMAN & KoSTECKI, supra note 1, at 76.
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based dispute settlement gave way to a rule-based approach. 0 2  Other
changes in this regard included the added legitimacy of the dispute settlement
system, enhanced judiciability, and international law obligations under the
rules.303 On balance, the shift from GATT to WTO can be characterized
as a "system transplantation."
At this point a summation of these events from a regime-theoretical
perspective seems relevant. However, a rigorous analysis of the "regime
status" of the multilateral trading system is beyond the scope of this
article.
The multilateral trade regime took shape from the vantage point of the
post-world-war political economy. Although the regime aimed at an
open trading structure and had liberal sentiments, it lacked strategies for
the effectuation of its goals. The United States, which had both liberal
sentiments and the ability to invest in and support the costs of a regime,
became the hegemonic power within the regime, 304 which at the risk of
exaggeration, could be described as Pax Americana. °5 However, after a
short period of ascendancy, the United States hegemony began to crack
under pressure, leaving the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making
procedures of the regime in a state of ambiguity. 30 6 The ambiguous
nature of the regime impacted actual practice with a high level of
inconsistency, thereby weakening it.30 7 Yet, the regime did not collapse
altogether; it endured with the aid of proliferating cooperation-the
natural alternative to hegemony. Cooperation thus came to sustain the
regime, but the modules of the regime-norms, principles, rules, and
procedures-that had been shaped in accordance with hegemonic needs
required a retooling in keeping with the needs of cooperation. This
302. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 118-32.
303. See generally id. at 162-67.
304. There is abundant literature on the theory of hegemonic stability. See, e.g.,
KEOHANE, supra note 268, at 182-216; HASENCLEVER ET AL, supra note 237 (reviewing
the theory); but see Duncan Snidal, The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory, 579 INT'L
ORG. 579 (1985) (criticizing the theory).
305. Snidal, supra note 304, at 613.
306. See KEOHANE, supra note 268 at 135-81 (providing a progressive picture of the
rise and fall of American hegemony).
307. According to Krasner, "[i]f the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making
procedures of the regime become less coherent, or if actual practice is increasingly
inconsistent with principles, norms, rules, and procedures, then [it means] a regime has
weakened." Krasner, supra note 237, at 189 (emphasis omitted).
transformation of the rules, procedures, norms and principles of the
regime constituted a comprehensive change.3 °8
In this development, the trade regimes-old and new-represented the
variable intervening between certain basic causal factors, e.g., economic
self-interest, power shifts and the resulting common expectations, and
certain outcomes and behavior. If Stephen Krasner's assertion that regimes
are sometimes dependent variables is taken seriously, 30 9 then it follows
that basic causal factors influence the nature of the regimes. This is
exactly what happened in the case of the multilateral trade regime. Both
the hegemonic and the cooperative regimes were predisposed by the
basic factors discussed above.
However, the theory that influenced the development of the second
phase of the multilateral trade regime was interest-based, which favored
(the scheme of) cooperation. It coincided with the advent of a liberal
market ideology-neoliberalism. 310 The interest-based theory nevertheless
recognized the economic self-interests of states in the trade regime-a
feature it shared with the power-based approach-and cooperation was
only seen as a mode for coordinating common expectations among states.
311
The threat of protectionism hung over the world economy as a
consequence of the liberal market ideology. States, in pursuit of capital,
were already racing to the bottom by erecting various barriers-political,
cultural, and environmental. In terms of strategy, they resembled the
prisoners in the PD, secluded from one another and speculating on one
another's action, with each wanting to be better off than his counterparts.312
For this reason, states looked upon the trade regime for mutual gains.
What they saw, however, was a trade regime handicapped by a lack of
institutional coordination. The pressing need of the time was a new 10
to formalize the norms, rules and principles and to enforce these by way
of sanctions. The WTO was established in response to this situation.
As the material manifestation of the multilateral trade regime, the
WTO is primarily expected to ensure predictability in trade deals,
308. Krasner has classified regime change into change within a regime and change
of a regime. If there is a change in the rules and procedures of the regime, it constitutes
a change within the regime, whereas any change in the norms and principles constitutes a
change of the regime. Id.
309. Id. at 195.
310. In order to avoid confusion between the neoliberal view under IR literature,
which deals with regimes in cooperative terms, and neoliberalism as the liberal market
ideology-the central theme of this article-the former is presented as an "interest-based
theory."
311. Cf KEOHANE, supra note 268, at 51-55 (repeatedly emphasizing the existence
of cooperation does not presuppose harmony). See also HASENCLEVER ET AL., supra note
237, at 28-33.
312. See HASENCLEVER ET AL., supra note 311, at 31 n.7 (illustrating the Prisoner's
Dilemma game in the interest-based context).
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precluding any scope for unpredictable moves on the part of states.3 13 Its
auxiliary functions in a broader perspective include harmonizing global
trade standards, diffusing norms and values, shaping the future neoliberal
manifesto by establishing cross-sectoral linkages 314 and enforcing the
neoliberal agenda.
2. The Neoliberal Strategies and Tools in the WTO
Under neoliberalism, tasks are equitably delegated by the state (which
remains the epicenter) among various actors. Such delegation of tasks is
made on the basis of certain performance criteria and on mutually
constitutive terms with neoliberal requirements. In this scheme, the state
yields a lion's share of its authority to 1Os, with the rationale that IOs
constitute the tools for the governance of common state interests.
However, given the nature of their existence as "juridical persons," IOs
face many restrictions and cannot perform every neoliberal role assigned
to them. This handicap has been adequately remedied in global governance
by framing apposite tools and functional working arrangements, although
many are left to be designed. Several of the innovative institutional
strategies in the WTO-lauded and censured-are a reflection of the
governance strategy. This part of the article will analyze three novel
institutional features of the WTO: the provision for amicus curiae briefs,
negative consensus, and trade policy review. The discussion will not
focus on the scholarly perspectives on these strategies, which are well
articulated elsewhere;" 5 rather it aims to highlight how they complement
neoliberalism.
313. This view is buttressed by the bicycle theory, according to which a multilateral
trade regime resembles a bicycle, which must gradually and incrementally go forward.
Despite the pressures, economic contingencies, and political circumstances, the bicycle
regime must progress towards even freer trade. On this journey, 1Os like the WTO,
by ensuring predictability regarding the route, facilitate the smooth progress of the
bicycle-the multilateral trading system. For a basic account of the significance of the
theory, see James Bacchus, The Bicycle Club: Affirming the American Interests in the
Future of the WTO, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 429, 430 (2003).
314. For perspectives on linkages, see Symposium, The Boundaries of WTO, 96
AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1996). For a recent discussion in this vein, see Claire R. Kelly, Power,
Linkage and Accommodation: The WTO as an International Actor and its Influence on
other Actors and Regimes, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 79 (2006).
315. See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Opening the WTO to Nongovernmental Interest, 24
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 173 (2000); C.L. Kim, The Amicus Brief Issue at the WTO, 4
CHINESE J. INT'L L. 85 (2005).
The concept of amicus curiae briefs: Amicus curiae316 (hereinafter amicus),
for international law, exemplifies private actor participation in international
lawmaking. While the concept is not alien to international law,317 it does
not have any glorious tradition of practice. 318 However, there has been
an exponential increase in the number of amicus briefs before the
international courts in the era of globalization. 319 The concept came into
the limelight when the WTO Appellate Body's (AB) overruled a Panel
report rejecting an application for an amicus brief in the Shrimp Turtle
Case.320 Since then, however, the available jurisprudence of the DSB provides
a convoluted picture of amicus participation in dispute settlement with the
AB (which is confronted with the interpretation) most of the time hiding
behind extreme formalism. 321 The abrupt rejection by the AB of all
applications for filing an amicus in the Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products (Asbestos case) is touted as an instance of
the victory of state sovereignty over the WTO.322 Yet, behind the molds
of formalism and the glorification of state sovereignty lurks the
organization's status quo as a site for the governance of globalization.
323
If the provision for amicus participation is interpreted less in strict legal
terms and more in light of the existential logic of the WTO, the
organization's receptiveness to the universalization of liberal democratic
316. The term literally means "friend of the court" who calls the attention of the
court to some point of law or judgment or on any matter relating to the case. OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 2nd ed. 1989. The provision for amicus curiae briefs is generally
set out in the writ of certiorari.
317. There are quite many instances where nongovernmental organizations
participate in the negotiations at various international bodies, such as the ILO and UN.
However, such participation has not been widespread in international settlement of
disputes.
318. It was understood that international courts had the power to permit amicus
participation under the general principles of law. Yet, in most of the cases the statute
establishing the court specifically conferred this power upon it. See Duncan B. Hollis,
Private Actors in Public International Law: Amicus Curiae and the Case for the
Retention of State Sovereignty, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 235, 238-39 (2002). In
this regard, also see Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in
International Judicial Proceedings, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 611 (1994).
319. Amicus participation is not limited to the WTO, but has also been seen in the
International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia, the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights, and others.
320. Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
andShrimp Products, 99-110, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
321. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, 50-57, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12,
2001).
322. See, e.g., Hollis, supra note 318.
323. Jens L. Mortensen, The Institutional Requirements of the WTO in an Era of
Globalization: Imperfection in the Global Economic Polity, 6 EUR. L.J. 176, 77 (2000).
However, given the institutional imperfection of the WTO, Mortensen does not fully
agree with the view that the WTO has become a governance site.
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values is clear.32 4 Given that such values are the cornerstone of governance,
the participation of civil society in the WTO's governance task is
essential. This indispensability has a simple logic: when the transplantation
of social activities from the local to the global level took place, it also
required a transformation, characterized by Thomas Franck as "a cosmic
but unmysterious change," of the democratic rights of civil society from
the national level to the universal level. 325 This democratic right by
design conferred upon civil society a right to be consulted and to take
part in the global governance process.326 However, these democratic
rights and the associated public participation are much larger in scope
than those seen in the IO-NGO relations of the recent past.
The scope of amicus participation in the overall neoliberal program
for the WTO cannot be overstated. Its significance cannot even be
restricted to that of a mere procedure of judicial efficiency. There is
likelihood of falling prey to the latter approach if the DSB's role is
measured only in terms of the settlement of disputes. However if one
considers the overall functions of the DSB, i.e., securing a positive
solution that is mutually acceptable to the parties and thereby maintaining
the equilibrium of the multilateral trade regime, it becomes apparent that
the DSB needs to reconcile conflicting values, rules, cultures, social
activities, ideologies, tastes, and so on. In other words, the DSB plays
an indirect role in homogenizing a broad-based consciousness. In this
perspective, every dispute before the DSB is a sign of a threat of
disequilibrium in a given area that needs to be rectified. Information
regarding the state of affairs in the area under threat is a prerequisite for
the effective reinstatement of a balance, as well as an indication of the
values and norms that need repair. A lawyer's brief is likely to overlook
324. The provision that is of primary importance in this regard is Article 13 of the
DSU. However, jurisprudence shows that Articles 11 (objective assessment criterion)
and 17(9) (procedural autonomy) are used as aids in interpreting Article 13. For support,
see Appellate Body Report, United States Imposition of Countervailing Duties on certain
Hot-rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom,
WT/DS138/AB/R, 36-42 (May 10, 2000).
325. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS tN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 85
(1995).
326. An argument in a similar vein is made in Petros Mavroidis, Amicus Curiae
Briefs Before the WTO: Much Ado About Nothing, in EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND
INTERNATIONAL CO-ORDINATION: STUDIES IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW IN
HONOUR OF CLAUSE-DIETER EHLERMANN 317 (Armin von Bogdandy, Petros C. Mavroidis &
Yves Meny eds., Kluwer, 2002), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/mavroi
disamicus.pdf.
the interests of the relevant actors in the given area, consideration of
which is decisive for restoring a balance and for preventing future imbalances.
Provisions like amicus participation, aside from providing the decision
makers with a true picture of the situation, enable the relevant actors,
such as civil society, to offer resistance to any sweeping changes-a
good neoliberal bargain.
Negative consensus. Negative consensus is a well-known negotiating
strategy, but its judicial application, brought out by the WTO, is an
innovation. In this strategy, a proposal-introduced in a negative manner,
e.g., "Panel Report X will not be adopted"-is deemed to have been
accepted when there is no objection from any WTO member present at
the meeting of the DSB.327 It is obvious that the winning member will
oppose the non-adoption of a Panel report in its favor, thereby making
the adoption practically automatic. In short, a decision is said to have
been taken when a consensus fails. The established reason for such a
procedure in the WTO decision-making process is to overcome the
problem common under GATT of non-adoption, or blocking, of Panel
reports, which required adoption by consensus at various stages. 328 Non-
adoption served the GATT Contracting Parties as a delaying strategy.329
Negative consensus has overcome this problem.
When negative consensus was introduced, a time limit was set for
every legal process that required a negative consensus vote. 330 In effect,
no such DSB proceedings can be delayed on account of a lack of
consensus. If this is the case, then what does negative consensus aim at?
First, it aims at minimizing aggressive unilateralism. 331 Second, and
significantly, it acts as a safety valve by ensuring the unhindered progress of
the multilateral trade regime, which is moving steadily forward towards
freer trade with the advance of neoliberalism. Economists have
cautioned the world about the possible danger of retarding the trade
regime, 3 the logic of which is aptly captured by James Bacchus in
terms of the bicycle theory:
[W]hatever the pressures, whatever the economic happenstances, and whatever
the political circumstances, we must always keep the bicycle we call the "world
trading system" going forward by making ever more progress toward ever freer
trade. . . . [I]f we do not [move steadily forward], the world will be
overwhelmed by all the many reactionary forces that would have the nations of
327. DSU art. 16(4).
328. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 384-85.
329. Id. at 123.
330. Id. at 384-85.
331. ISIKELI MATAITOGA, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
MECHANISM: A DEVELOPING COUNTRY PERSPECTIVE 2 (2005), http://documents.ag.gov.ti/wto
DisputeResolution-mataitoga.pdf.
332. See generally BHAGWATI, supra note 294.
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the world retreat from trade.... [T]he world will turn away from growing
economic integration, turn away from the mutual propensity of growing
economic interdependence, and turn inward toward all the self-deceiving
illusions and all the self-defeating delusions of an isolating and enervating
economic autarchy. 333
Given the role of the DSB in maintaining the balance of the trade regime
and in facilitating the progress of the multilateral trading system, its
institutional limbs must also work towards removing all procedural
barriers which are likely to encourage inertia. A consensus rule like the
one that stalled the adoption of many Panel Reports in GATT is next to
impossible in the WTO. The present automatic nature of the procedure
foils any blocking or halting of DSB proceedings and ensures the
organization's unconstrained functioning.
Trade policy review: The Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) is
the surveillance wing of the WTO, which monitors and periodically
reviews the trade polices of the member countries. 33 4 The TPRM enhances
the transparency of members' trade policies and thereby facilitates the
smooth functioning of the multilateral trading system.335 Central to the
strategic objectives of the TPRM is the harmonization of the trade policies
of various countries, which, if left in discord, would likely encourage
protectionism and impede free trade. A system of transparency in national
trade policies helps the member countries to better understand and
evaluate each other's position and coordinate their activities accordingly.
336
The resulting openness foils any protectionist measures. However, a
review by the TPRM is not an investigation culminating in a judicial
process and followed by sanctions for nonconformity. 337 This orientation
enshrined in the WTO Agreement itself declares: "[Trade policy review]
is not, however, intended to serve as a basis for the enforcement of
specific obligations under the Agreements or for dispute settlement
333. Bacchus, supra note 313, at 430.
334. See Annex III of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.
Generally, two reports on the trade policies of the member country under review are
prepared; one by the WTO secretariat and the other by the government of the member
country under review. The former is an independent one, whereas the latter is a governmental
policy statement. Trade Policy Review Mechanism, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 3, Legal Instruments- Results of the
Uruguay Round [hereinafter TPRM], http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/29-tprm.pdf.
335. TPRM A.
336. Petros Mavroidis, Surveillance Schemes: The GATT's New Trade Policy
Review Mechanism, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 374, 375 (1992).
337. See Roderick Abbott, GATT and the Trade Policy Review Mechanism: Further
Reflections on Earlier Reflections, 27 J. WORLD TRADE 117, 117-18 (1993).
procedures, or to impose new policy commitments on Members. 338 The
TPRM ensures smooth progress towards freer trade.
If this is the legal status of the TPRM, then its philosophical base is in
neoliberalism. A compelling argument supporting this assertion is found
in the IR literature, in the cognitivist approach to regimes. Cognitivism,
despite the duality in the school,339 emphasizes the importance of ideas
and knowledge in the shaping and functioning of regimes. In such a
knowledge-based perspective, an assessment of the situation and the
identification of interests in a given area enables states to make effective
policy decisions. The TPRM provides states with knowledge about the
general trading climate, acting as an epistemic community having a
common awareness of the trading situation. The fact that the TPRM is
housed in an 10 with strong normative roots forestalls the prospect of
loose, interest-based epistemic communities influencing state policies
and thus provides a high degree of institutionalization in the sharing of
ideas and knowledge. The resulting transparency helps states to understand
the trading situation and fashion their trade policies in accordance with
neoliberal requirements, while at the same time balancing their interests
and continuing role in the multilateral trade regime.
The three features observed above do not exhaust the list of governance
tools in WTO. The neoliberal agenda is advanced through the joint action
of any number of such tools. The dose of neoliberalism incorporated in
each tool nevertheless varies depending on its function.
Even collectively the three tools discussed-amicus participation,
negative consensus and trade policy review-account for only a minor
share in the whole work of the organization. In the general governance
scheme of the WTO, amicus participation provides expertise on work in
specific areas, to a large extent functioning as the agora; the same holds
for trade policy reviews, which provide system awareness; negative
consensus, which removes procedural blocks in the DSB, for its part,
applies more on the management side of the WTO.
The arguments presented in the two sections above substantiate the
WTO's status as a neoliberal 10.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE RECKONING
Although it has dispelled the myths surrounding WTO and identified
its real source of authority, the article has not yet taken up the question
why, after all, the WTO matters in the modem world. An unsophisticated
338. TPRM A (i).
339. The dual views are categorized as weak cognitivism and strong cognitivism.
See supra note 245. For present purposes, I consider both views together.
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answer, in the form of a syllogism, will serve as a starting point: lOs
matter in the modem world; the WTO is an 10; therefore the WTO
matters. Too naYve a deduction, to be sure, yet herein lie elements of a
simple truth. The major and minor premises of the syllogism (lOs matter;
the WTO is an 10) have been proven above. The task remaining is to
elucidate the conclusion (the WTO matters), which is undertaken below.
Once this is done, the paper relates the findings to the thickened
normativity in international law and to the legacy of legal positivism.
A. Why Does the WTO Matter?
The post-world-war economy was fashioned on the basis of a
compromise. On one side was the economic nationalism of the 1930s
and on the other free trade and certain liberal monetary policies.
Domestic interventionism and multilateralism coexisted. In other words,
what one saw was a combination of Keynesian economics---"national self-
sufficiency" and "economic isolation" 40-and Fordist ideas of capital
accumulation regimes and modes of regulation. 341 The condition is better
known as "embedded liberalism," to use John Gerard Ruggie's term.342
What made the compromise possible was the formation of a multilateral
trade regime and the ensuing institutionalization of embedded liberalism-
an unprecedented and odd configuration. In the overall scheme, the
Fordist policy of capital flight was given primacy. The monetary side-
effects of the flight of capital e.g., balance of payments deficits, were
handled by the Bretton Woods Institutions (mainly the IMF). However,
regimes of capital accumulation, although providing economic growth,
are highly susceptible to crises.3 4 3 This drawback was remedied to a certain
extent by the Keynesian strategy of state intervention and other modes of
regulation, which included laws, institutions, power, and hegemony.
340. The main objective behind Keynes' call for economic isolationism and
national self-sufficiency was the elimination of the threat of capital flight. For details,
see James R. Crotty, On Keynes and Capital Flight, 21 J. ECON. LITERATURE 59, 61
(1983).
341. Regimes of capital accumulation, although providing economic growth, are
highly vulnerable to crises; hence they are stabilized and maintained by modes of
regulations, which include laws, institutions, power, and hegemony. For an understanding of
the theory and various perspectives, see REGULATION THEORY: THE STATE OF ART
(Robert Boyer & Yves Salliard eds., 2002).
342. John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change:
Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT'L ORG. (SPECIAL ISSUE)
379, 393 (1982).
343. Boyer & Salliard, supra note 341, at 30.
Nevertheless, the trade regime was maintained by the United States
hegemony. In this framework GATT had a minor role, i.e., the elimination
of tariff barriers to facilitate the smooth flight of capital by encouraging
states to enter into reciprocal and mutually beneficial arrangements.
There was nothing in its framework of rules or functions that could
generate strong compliance by the states.344 GATT first worked as a tool
of the hegemon's interests and later as a negotiation forum. What
success it has to its credit owes mainly to the economic and security
interests the hegemon and other states had at that time.
With the collapse of United States hegemony and the change of regime
towards a cooperation-based model, the role of 1Os also underwent a
transformation (Post-Fordists consider this a transformation towards a
new regime of capital accumulation). The new regime of multilateral
trade driven by the neoliberal ideology also required the accumulation of
capital, regulated and stabilized by new modes of regulation. However,
under the new regime, capital accumulation worked on the basis of a
global demand rather than demand within a nation. To meet this requirement,
all social relations were removed from their national context and
restructured at the global level. In this state of affairs, the old mode of
regulation comprising the Keynesian strategy of state intervention
became a counterfeit coin. What was required instead was a new and
innovative mode of regulation to control and stabilize the international
flight of capital. In political terms, the scenario represented the failure
of nation-states to work effectively in the available mode of regulation.
Under the new mode of regulation, Keynesianism, quite obviously, was
discarded, as was hegemonic control. The strategy of institutionalization
was retained, however, to serve the cooperation model regime. The
state, although remaining the centerpiece, retreated from the limelight,
and now functioned through non-state actors, that is, in a fiduciary position.
However, the post-Fordists have cautioned about the crisis hanging
over every regime of capital accumulation; 345 if such a crisis occurred, it
would be disastrous for the current multilateral trade regime, even with
the new modes of regulation. The fall of the old trade regime was due to
the collapse of the hegemon, which constituted the primary mode of
regulation of that regime. In order to avoid such a situation, the present
cooperative model regime must, at whatever cost, maintain cooperation.
In other words, the fiduciary relationship between the states must be
maintained. This requires more effective modes of regulation.
344. Cf Douglas A. Irwin, GA TT in Historical Perspective, 85 AM. ECON. REv. 323(1995) (discussing how GATT, though imperfect, still helped to encourage trade after
during the interwar period).
345. See generally Boyer & Salliard, supra note 341.
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The WTO, as the institutional manifestation of the regime, is assigned
the primary function of maintaining the fiduciary relationship among
states by providing system awareness, helping states build a reputation in
their dealings (agora) and, thereby, ensuring predictability for the regime.
Second, the WTO performs the traditional roles-to some extent performed
by GATT as well-such as removing, by universalizing norms and cultures,
all trade barriers that threaten cooperation, settling disputes, and ensuring
compliance. The WTO's specially designed structural features augment the
performance of its role: mechanisms like the TPRM, which reveals the
existing barriers to trade and conveys to the members the likelihood of
danger, and the DSB, which tackles deviation from the rules and secures
a positive solution that is mutually acceptable to the parties and thereby
maintains the equilibrium of the multilateral trade regime. Non-compliance
is least preferred, given the danger of hampering cooperation. In sum, the
expectations of states converge in the WTO, which is the material
manifestation of the trade regime.
Atomistic states, which act behind the scenes through their agents and
hence resemble prisoners, will always try to minimize their losses-the
only and best option to maximize their gains. The WTO reveals each
member's trading position and hence minimizes the danger of egoistic
actions from other members-thanks to the agora. This is, however,
notwithstanding its role in removing trade barriers through positive
harmonization.
In the present international trade regime, where trade relations are
enmeshed in the labyrinth of the prisoners' dilemma, reciprocity finds no
resistance and the WTO as the embodiment of the regime, appears to
have the teeth to bite. However, the WTO's institutional features are not
immaterial but become salient only when the social situation in which
the institution functions becomes favorable.
B. The Normative Case for International Law and the
Return of Positivism
In the present context, normativity is a result of certain patterned behavior
among states346 whereby states, having fallen into anarchy, responded
positively to the common interest of ongoing cooperation. This behavior
346. For support, see Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm
Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT'L ORG . 887 (1998) (discussing the norm "life
cycle").
generated certain values, which in turn formed the basis of a set of
norms. When a set of valid norms came into existence, it naturally gave
rise to a new regime. Yet, that regime was far from complete because its
component norms remained sterile in the absence of rules urging compliance
and institutional mechanisms to coordinate the governance of common
interests. Therefore, states by agreement gave shape to a rule-based
architecture, in the form of the WTO, based on a uniform set of
principles and a mechanism for settling disputes. At the same time that
the robustness of the regime fetched a high degree of compliance with
the rules from the states, international law, which governs the relationship
between states, gained a strong case for its thickened normativity.
However, on the whole, rules, norms, and regimes all seem to have
some element of artificiality attached to them. Rules can certainly be
identified with norms, and norms can arguably constitute a regime, but
what makes a regime a basis of valid normativity? If regimes are forged
by humans, then any claims regarding their normative content are
suspect at best, for the existence of norms requires social practices
resulting from a particular social situation. However, throughout this
part of the article, I have asserted the view that although regimes are
maintained by human strategies, the formation of those regimes is purely
a social action. In other words, regimes are formed when states react to
a prevailing anarchy. The reaction (social forces) leads to a new patterned
behavior, which generates norms. States construct their common
expectations on the basis of these norms. Accordingly, a regime is a
normative base validated by social conventions. This validation of norms
by social conventions has been the fundamental assertion of legal positivists.
In sum, social forces stand in prime perspective; they constitute Austin's
sovereign as well as Hart's ultimate rule; their authority derives from a
social situation, e.g., anarchy, and leads to patterned behavior and
generates norms. However, given the fact that the driving ideology
behind these forces is neoliberalism, it must stand as the protagonist in
any reckoning.
This article set out to achieve three goals: 1) to locate the WTO within
the contemporary social order, 2) to liberate international lawyers from
their obsession with positivism as generally understood and from their
futile hunt for alternatives to a sovereign, its commands and sanctions in
the WTO, and 3) to reveal the synchrony between legal positivism and
neoliberalism.
With regard to the first of these ambitions, the work rectified the myth
concerning WTO as a positivist enterprise. It demonstrated that the
forces of neoliberalism are the real source of power for the WTO and
thereby situated the organization within the contemporary social order
driven by neoliberalism. It also showed that the thickened normativity
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of international law is a product of the social order and not the apparatuses
of the WTO.
Where the second aim is concerned, the research revealed that Austin's
theories and assertions on the legality--or lack thereof--of international
law were products of his era, whereby international lawyers' adversaries in
the battle for legality were their own misunderstandings about Austin's
work. Indeed, positivism in its fundamental form has favored international
law throughout the former's existence. International lawyers are hereinafter
liberated from the search for a sovereign sitting on a throne or
commands and sanctions in any institutional structures. In addition, by
showing that neoliberalism is positivism in another manifestation, the
article brings legal positivism to the ongoing world-order discourse centered
on neoliberalism.
Third, the article aspired to synchronize legal positivism and neoliberalism;
this ambition did not, however, avow that the two were conflicting
schools of thought but rather that they are different forms of the same
wisdom. Positivism's dynamism also becomes obvious. In pointing out
the parallels between neoliberalism and positivism, the article enabled
international lawyers and social scientists to develop a common
viewpoint regarding the WTO and pool their ideas jointly for enhancing
the social utility of the organization.
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